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What is the United States stake in Southeast Asia? Why are Americans fighting in Vietnam? In this issue, the extent of the United States political, economic and military commitments in Southeast Asia is explored; the political situation in South Vietnam today is evaluated; and the uneasy alliance between China and North Vietnam is analyzed. To balance the issue, one author offers a positive view of the United States "stake" in Vietnam; another provides a critical review of what he terms the United States "misadventure" there. Our introductory article lays the groundwork for the discussion, pointing out that "Today, the United States is committed to assisting the Vietnamese in South Vietnam to repel and destroy the Communist forces attacking in their territory and to develop the sinews of a viable state."

Political Commitment in Southeast Asia

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ANY ANALYSIS of American commitments to Southeast Asia must take account of the time and circumstances when the commitment was made, the objectives sought in making the commitments and the means used subsequently to ensure their effectiveness. Between August, 1945, when Japan surrendered, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the United States was in the process of liquidating its wartime commitments and limiting its postwar obligations as far as possible. American occupation of Japan was to continue only until Japan could get back on her feet and manage her own affairs. Occupation of South Korea was to continue until arrangements could be made for Korean unification under United Nations auspices.

American efforts to prevent a full-scale civil war in China through mediation were abandoned by early 1948 although economic

and military aid to the Nationalist Chinese was continued another year. American military and economic aid for the French in their war against the Communist Viet Minh forces in Indochina gradually accelerated after 1946 and by 1954 had reached \$1.2 billion. Other countries around China's southern borders were recipients of varying amounts of economic aid between 1945 and 1950.

The immediate postwar policy of the United States in Asia, therefore, was one of very limited commitment using economic aid, military assistance and diplomacy as its principal instruments. It was clearly hoped (as continuing testimony before congressional committees revealed) that even this limited involvement of the United States in the development of the nations of Asia would not have to be substantially increased but, in some cases, could be reduced. It was believed by many, both in and out of government, that

Asian nations, with some help, could put their houses in order and show progress toward political stability and viable economies. If the leaders of the new nations in Asia did not realize what a hard task "nation-building" was to be, there were many Americans who lacked that realization also.

United States policy toward Asia in the immediate postwar period had the same broad objectives as United States policy toward Europe, namely, to assist other nations to become able to take care of themselves, defend themselves and participate in a peaceful and orderly world. Americans wanted nations in Western Europe and in Asia, as well, to achieve a viable independence, stable enough to prevent Communist domination. For the first time in its history, for now well-known reasons, the United States entered into a peacetime alliance system with the states of Western Europe, backed by peacetime use of American armed forces stationed on the European continent. In 1949, few diplomats or specialists envisaged that this new departure in American policy would be extended to the continent of Asia.

It was the rapid collapse of the Chinese Kuomintang government and the establishment of the Communist "People's Republic of China" that threw all previous assumptions of American policy towards Asia into the discard. Just when American strategy was being aimed toward helping the free nations of Europe to rebuild and toward containing any further Soviet expansion westward, the United States was confronted with the specter of a sudden, potentially dangerous and very potent accretion to the Communist camp—the establishment of a Communist China.

THE COMMUNIST MONOLITH

In the fall of 1949, therefore, the Communist world seemed to be a huge monolith, stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific, and the Sino-Soviet alliance appeared to be a combination of power that might soon threaten the independent existence of all of

the new, non-Communist nations in the vast Asian area. Even at that moment, the first Indochinese war was in full swing and a Communist North Korea, with Soviet support, was proving intractable and belligerent. Prevention or containment of Communist expansion in Asia, therefore, became part and parcel of the policy of blocking Communist advances in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Before the start of the Korean War, Communist advance seemed most likely in the French Indochina territories and one of the earliest statements of the United States commitment to Southeast Asia is worth quoting, particularly for its definition of United States objectives. On February 7, 1950, the Department of State issued an official statement as follows:¹

The Government of the United States has accorded diplomatic recognition to the Governments of the State of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia. . . . Our diplomatic recognition of these governments is based on the formal establishment of the State of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia as independent states within the French Union; this recognition is consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.

In June of last year this government expressed its gratification at the signing of the France-Viet-Name agreements of March 8, which provided the basis for the evolution of Viet-Name independence within the French Union. These agreements, together with similar accords between the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, have now been ratified by the French National Assembly and signed by the President of the French Republic. This ratification has established the independence of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia as associated states within the French Union.

It is anticipated that the full implementation of these basic agreements and of supplementary accords which have been negotiated and are awaiting ratification, will promote political stability and the growth of effective democratic institutions in Indochina. This government is considering what steps it may take at this time to further these objectives and to assure, in collaboration with other like-minded nations, that this development shall not be hindered by internal dissension fostered from abroad.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, February 20, 1950, pp. 291-292. (Italics mine.)

Following this announcement in February, additional arrangements for assistance to the French in their war against the Viet Minh forces were made and on May 8, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson issued the following declaration:²

The [French] Foreign Minister and I have just had an exchange of views on the situation in Indochina and are in general agreement both as to the urgency of the situation in that area and as to the necessity for remedial action. We have noted the fact that the problem of meeting the threat to the security of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos which now enjoy independence within the French Union is primarily the responsibility of France and the Governments and peoples of Indochina. The United States recognizes that the solution of the Indochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security and upon the development of genuine nationalism and that United States assistance can and should contribute to these major objectives.

The United States government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the United States government obviously feared that the Chinese Communists might attempt to invade Formosa and/or come to the aid of the Communist Ho Chi Minh forces locked in armed struggle with the French. On June 27, 1950, President Harry S Truman redefined the problem of American security in Asia. In addition to the use of American forces in Korea, the President asserted that the United States would regard an attack on Formosa as a threat to American security; he was therefore ordering the Seventh Fleet to interpose itself between Taiwan and the mainland.

President Truman stated that he was ordering more military assistance to the Philippines and the strengthening of United States forces there. He also asserted that he was ordering increased military assistance to "France and the Associated States of Indochina," and the dispatch of a United States military mission to step up the use of assistance previously granted the French. After the massive Chinese intervention in Korea, the urgency of helping France defeat Communist forces in Indochina intensified and the United States sought support for this effort as it had for resistance to aggression in Korea.

On December 17, 1952, the NATO Council by resolution *acknowledged* "that the resistance of the free nations in Southeast Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community; and therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indochina deserves continuing support from the NATO governments."³

The protracted armistice negotiations in Korea were finally concluded on July 27, 1953, and American policy-makers expressed concern that the cease-fire in Korea would permit the Chinese Communist armies to be transferred south to support the Viet Minh forces. The French debacle at Dien Bien Phu occurred the following May, when the Geneva Conference was already in session to attempt to settle the future of both Korea and Indochina. On June 11, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a major foreign policy speech on Asia in Los Angeles in which he attempted to explain the United States position in the Geneva negotiations and set forth the nature of American objectives and commitments to southeast Asia. In this speech, the Secretary asserted,⁴

The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is one of restoring tranquility in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion by Communist China. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion, might

² *Department of State Bulletin*, May 22, 1950, p. 821. This declaration was issued in Paris where Dean Acheson was attending a Western foreign ministers' meeting.

³ *Department of State Bulletin*, January 5, 1953, p. 4.

⁴ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, pp. 791-793.

justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.

On July 20 and 21, 1954, cease-fire agreements were signed at Geneva with respect to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, providing elaborate regulations for withdrawal of armed forces and international supervision of these regulations. An unsigned declaration of the conference provided that free elections to determine the future of the two Vietnams would be held in July, 1956. The United States declared it favored this proposal "to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure they are conducted fairly." It also asserted that the United States would refrain from "the threat or use of force" to disturb the Geneva accords.

On September 8, 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was established at Manila. This treaty provided that in case of an armed attack on any signatory or in case the territory, sovereignty or political independence of a signatory were threatened, the members would consult as to what action should be taken.⁵ It was also agreed that no action in the territory of any state would be taken "except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned." By a special protocol, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were designated as beneficiaries of Article IV.⁶

The foregoing summary of the development of American commitments to Southeast Asia is illustrative of their evolution and scope. Two subsequent changes in the general situa-

⁵ Article IV. The signatories were: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁶ For the full text of the SEATO treaty, plus the protocol on Vietnam, see *Current History*, November, 1954, p. 321.

⁷ The changing situation in Southeast Asia in these two periods has been described in detail by the author in previous articles for this magazine. See "The U.S. in Southern Asia," *Current History*, February, 1965, pp. 65 ff., and "U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia," February, 1966, pp. 106 ff.

tion in Southeast Asia affected United States commitments. The first set of changed circumstances took place between 1959 and 1963 and the second in 1964-1965.⁷

In the first situation, the government of Laos suffered a series of changes and came under severe attack by the Communist Pathet Lao supported by the North Vietnamese. At the same time, it became increasingly clear that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam had failed to measure up to its earlier promise as a stable regime and that this failure was being exploited by the Hanoi government to provide large-scale support for an increased insurgency within South Vietnam. The American government, therefore, was faced with Communist-supported attacks in two Southeast Asian countries that could well topple their governments unless the United States and other nations moved quickly.

In the situation in Laos, the response of the United States was, first, to guarantee Thailand against attack and to establish bases close to the Laos border for a contingent of 5,000 United States troops and air support by agreement with the Thai government. Second, the United States moved to support a Geneva Conference in 1962 (convened by Britain and the Soviet Union) that resulted in the neutralization of Laos and the withdrawal of United States forces from Laos. The result has been far from satisfactory, but it has enabled a non-Communist Laos government to function.

In the case of Vietnam, President John F. Kennedy's Administration, becoming more and more disillusioned with the Diem regime, "acquiesced" in a coup d'état in 1963 while at the same time increasing the numbers of United States military personnel in Vietnam from a few hundred to more than 16,000 over the following 12 months.

A careful reading of official statements indicates that the basic American commitments to Southeast Asia initiated by the Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower Administrations were continued by the Kennedy and the Johnson Administrations in succeeding years. Today, as in the past decade, the United

States is committed to assisting the Vietnamese in South Vietnam to repel and destroy the Communist forces attacking in their territory and aiding the government of South Vietnam to extend its authority and presence throughout its territory and to develop the sinews of a viable state, politically and economically and socially. Beyond this, the United States is committed to protecting the integrity of Thailand from external attack and to assisting the Thai government to repel insurgency within its borders.

In respect to all the states of Southeast Asia, the United States has committed itself, in cooperation with other nations of the Asian-Pacific area, to assistance in the longer-range economic, social and political development of these states to the end that they will become able to manage their own affairs effectively and protect themselves against internal subversion. In case of clear interference from outside their territories, the United States is committed to assisting them, with armed forces if necessary, *upon their request and with their consent*. These commitments have been made, as President Lyndon Johnson repeated again in his news conference on November 17, 1967, because the United States government believes that the security of the states of Southeast Asia is intimately related to the security of the United States and the future security of all the free nations in the Asian-Pacific area. This justification for present United States commitments to Southeast Asia has been supported by the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand—our allies who are contributing to the war in Vietnam—and it was recently endorsed by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan on his visit to Washington during the second week of November, 1967.

The foregoing is by no means a complete account of detailed American commitments to Southeast Asia since 1945, but is illustrative of the nature and scope of our official commitments. It is presented as a basis for the analysis that follows.

COMMITMENTS ANALYZED

First, it is clear that since 1945, the United

States government has sought to make only limited commitments to Southeast Asia on the basis of its evaluation of the circumstances requiring United States action to continue to help preserve the integrity of the states of that area from external threats and internal subversion. The *self-imposed* limitations by the United States have included a clear and continuing policy of intervention only when the dangers come from Communist aggression or Communist-inspired subversion. In the case of Communist insurgencies in Burma, in Malaya and in the Philippines, the American commitment has been limited in general to economic assistance, military equipment and a few advisers. In the case of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation and the Indian-Pakistani “summer war,” the United States exerted diplomatic and mediatory pressure but refused, essentially, to make a military commitment to one side or the other.

Second, the United States has consistently sought to “internationalize” its commitments in the Vietnamese war, and in other situations resulting from Communist aggression, such as the situation in Thailand. Beginning with the SEATO conference, in continuing consultations held between American officials and those of our allies, including the Manila Conference of October, 1966, the United States has sought to gain approval not only for American commitments in Southeast Asia, but also for the means by which the American government has tried to make good on its commitments, including the now massive use of military force in the Vietnamese war. This action has been successful and Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Thailand have committed units of their armed forces to the war in Vietnam, as well as other kinds of assistance.

LONG-RANGE GOALS

Third, the United States has not neglected to attempt to implement its commitments to the states of Southeast Asia to assist in their longer-range economic development. Perhaps the fullest statement of this “non-military” commitment was made by President Johnson in his speech of April 7, 1965, at the

Johns Hopkins University when the President proposed the organization of the Asia Development Bank with a billion dollar capitalization and pledged increased United States support for the international Mekong Valley development scheme and similar projects. A clear byproduct of the growing commitments of the United States to Southeast Asia has been the expansion of a variety of efforts on a regional basis towards cooperative economic development.

MEANS, NOT SUBSTANCE

The final and most important point to be made about present American commitments to Southeast Asia is that most of the debate, the expressions of discontent and the opposition to our present course from many segments of the public and the Congress revolve around the *means* employed by successive administrations to implement our commitments, *not* necessarily the substance of the commitments themselves. Except for the extremists—either those who want the United States to “end the war with victory,” by whatever means and at whatever risks, or those who want the United States to “withdraw” no matter what the consequences for the peoples of Southeast Asia and for America’s position as a great power—the swirling arguments revolve around our employment of *means* to the *ends* asserted as legitimate by successive administrations. To bomb North Vietnam or to halt the bombing; to restrict the use of weapons; to reduce our armed forces or to attempt to disengage to an “enclave” strategy; these and similar questions are constantly debated in the press, among the public and in the halls of Congress.

It may be appropriate at this point to repeat the reported analysis of the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, during his visit to Washington in late October, 1967. He is reported to have said that in 1958 or in 1961 or as late as 1963, the United States had an opportunity “to get off the bus.” But, Prime Minister Lee asserted, since the United States chose instead to involve itself

in a major war on the Asian continent, it has not only committed itself to an honorable conclusion of the conflict—one that will insure the continued independence of the nations of Southeast Asia—but also has involved all of the nations of Southeast Asia in the outcome. In other words, the future of all these nations in this area is riding on the outcome of the Vietnamese war.

In concluding this analysis of American commitments to Southeast Asia, the author believes what he wrote two years ago at this time is still valid.⁸

With our present commitment toward Vietnam and our involvement with Thailand and the future status of Laos and Cambodia, where will the United States be when the fighting stops, as it must sometime? Will the United States have incurred such large-scale commitments in this part of Southeast Asia as to make it impossible for us to avoid the involved and complex tasks of political, social and economic reconstruction? And, if so, how can we manage this without acting like (or, in fact, becoming) an imperial power in this part of the world?

PROBLEMS AHEAD

These complexities and dilemmas of American policy in Southeast Asia seem likely to confront the United States government with its toughest foreign policy problems in the years ahead. For the manner in which the United States attempts to fulfill its commitments and the means it employs, whether political, economic or military or any combination thereof, may well determine whether the United States is regarded by other nations as responsible and reasonable in its actions, or erratic and unpredictable.

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⁸ William C. Johnstone, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” *Current History*, February, 1966, p. 117.

Discussing the problems which surround Southeast Asian economic development, this specialist states that "The prospects for success depend . . . on the maintenance of the moral commitment of the United States to provide . . . its share of the resources necessary to help [these] countries reduce the economic gap which separates them from more fortunate parts of the world."¹

U.S. Economic Commitment in Southeast Asia

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FOR ALMOST 70 YEARS the United States has been committed to the development of the Philippines as an independent democratic nation with a viable economy. Over the decades, great amounts of American advice and assistance have been provided for this purpose. And yet, in May, 1967, a senior American official told a congressional committee that United States economic aid to the Philippines has had to be limited for some years, pending "the day when a purposefully directed national will for economic and social development would emerge."¹ Does this discouraging comment also apply to the more recent American concern with the economic growth of other Southeast Asian countries?

Prior to World War II, the United States had little economic involvement in Southeast Asia, except for the special case of the Philippines. The trade and foreign investment of the region were controlled by European colonial powers, which had invested more than \$4 billion in the area. Burma, what is now Malaysia, and Singapore were parts of the British Empire. Indonesia was a Dutch pos-

session and the French ruled Indochina. Thailand, though politically independent, was strongly influenced by European economic interests.

After the end of the war, the breakup of the colonial system and the economic weakness of the European metropolises left a power vacuum in Southeast Asia. Political instability and breakdowns in law and order were widespread as new nations sought to establish their governmental institutions. Some countries had suffered extensive damage to production and transportation facilities. In all of them new leaders sought a higher standard of living for their peoples through economic development. They looked to the United States as the principal source of the investment capital and other help required for their rehabilitation and economic growth.

Neither the United States government nor its private investors rushed into the vacuum left by the withdrawal or expulsion of the colonial powers. During the immediate post-war period the United States was preoccupied with European recovery. Overseas investment opportunities were plentiful in Europe and in other areas better known to American entrepreneurs than the exotic and troubled countries of Southeast Asia.

¹ Statement by R. M. Poats, Assistant Administrator, AID (Agency for International Development), *Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1967*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 737.

American governmental interest in the economic progress of Southeast Asian countries was first demonstrated through modest technical assistance activities inaugurated under the Point IV program in 1950. Prior to that date, the United States had also recognized its special relationship to the Philippines by financing that country's physical reconstruction of war damage. But it was not until the French defeat in Indochina in 1954 and the emergence of North Vietnam (with Communist Chinese support) as an ominous threat to the security of the region that the United States, for a combination of strategic, political and humanitarian reasons, began to accept a position of leadership. American concern with strengthening the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia to contain Chinese influence was manifested in the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. It was also evidenced in the shift of the American economic aid program from small-scale, long-range, technical assistance to major expenditures designed to support the internal costs of maintaining indigenous military forces and to accelerate development by investment in infrastructural, agricultural and industrial projects, expansion of education and health services and modernization of government.

EXTENT OF LEGAL COMMITMENT

The question of how far the United States has become "committed" in Southeast Asia has been raised by Senator J. William Fulbright and others. The charge has been made that the support of governments through economic aid led to American military assistance and then to active involvement of American forces in Laos and Vietnam and potentially in Thailand, without disclosure to Congress of the consequences of each successive step. The evolution of United States policy in Vietnam is dealt with in another article in this issue but, in a strict sense, there is no con-

tinuing American commitment to provide economic aid to Vietnam or to other nations of Southeast Asia.

With the exception of the obligations involved in membership in the Asian Development Bank, explicitly authorized by Congress, none of the relevant treaties or international agreements legally commit the United States to take specific action to support the economies of the Southeast Asian countries or to supply aid for their development. The economic article of the SEATO treaty, for example, merely pledges cooperation with other members of the organization in "measures to promote economic progress and well-being." The United States foreign economic assistance program does not represent a continuing commitment. It has been based on year-by-year congressional authorizations, under which the United States has annually entered into agreements with the individual countries concerning the amounts and types of assistance to be provided, and the specific actions which each party would take to achieve the agreed development objectives.

United States involvement in Southeast Asia is not based on concern about important American economic interests. Neither the trade of these countries nor the volume of American investment is a major factor for the American economy.² They currently import less than \$1 billion of American goods annually, of which perhaps a quarter represents commodities financed by United States economic aid. Their exports to the United States in 1966 were less than \$850 million. These figures represent about four per cent of American exports and imports. The Philippines account for about one-half of the region's exports to the United States and about one-third of the imports from the United States. These countries do not supply commodities important to the United States economy or essential to its strategic materials requirements, other than rubber, tin and copra, for each of which the United States has alternative sources of supply or substitutes. American private investments in this region amount to about \$911 million, or less than two per cent of American overseas financial interests.

² Trade figures from *Direction of Trade, International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development* (Washington), March, 1967. Investment figures from *Survey of Current Business*, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, September, 1966.

Sixty per cent of these investments are concentrated in the Philippines.

If the United States is not legally and formally wed to the development of the countries of this region, it is at least joined with them in a common law marriage. Each of the last three American Presidents has declared this government's deep interest in their economic progress. President Lyndon B. Johnson's message to the Congress on January 18, 1966, restated the long-standing policy that "the United States has committed itself over a decade and a half to major assistance programs in Asia, making food, development loans and technical assistance available to those who required our aid." He emphasized the American concern with the international turmoil and anxiety brought about by an Asia of conflict, hunger, disease and illiteracy, and enunciated the doctrine that the modernization of Asian economies is vital to world peace.

The United States is obligated to provide continuing support for the development of Southeast Asia primarily in the sense that this action is a consequence of enlightened American self-interest in a pacific and prosperous world. In a shorter range, as long as the United States also hopes to limit the spread of Chinese influence among the nations of this area, it must offer them assistance to further their economic development by non-Communist methods.

HOW MUCH PROGRESS TO DATE?

Each of the nations of Southeast Asia differs from its neighbors. Each has distinctive problems and capabilities. The level of American involvement with economic development varies from country to country.

The area as a whole is still handicapped by basic problems which deter economic growth and discourage investment. Export earnings are subject to the vagaries of world market prices and, in recent years, to unfavorable terms of trade. High rates of population increase tend to cancel out advances in production. Only a small part of the population has moved from the traditional agrarian society into a modern monetary one, and trained

manpower is scarce. Governments and other institutions essential for development are weak. In most countries, the elite groups have not been convinced that immediate satisfactions must be sacrificed to permit growth for the future.

VIETNAM

Economic and technical assistance to South Vietnam is the largest single operation in the American foreign aid program. Almost half of all the overseas personnel of the Agency for International Development (AID) are working in Vietnam; more than \$500 million, over 20 per cent of the world-wide total of economic assistance funds, is being expended annually for AID's work in that country. In addition, \$200 million worth of United States agricultural commodities is being supplied to Vietnam under the Food for Peace program.

Since almost all of South Vietnam is an actual or potential area of military activity, the economic aid program in that country is very different in content and methods of operation from the programs in other Southeast Asian nations. The United States has intervened so massively in the economy that it operates, in effect, an American organization parallel to the South Vietnamese government to control and check the use of aid funds. This situation has some resemblance to the program for the care of the civilian population behind the European battle lines in World War II, administered primarily by military government personnel; it also resembles the initial period of the American economic mission to Greece during the civil war in that country. Both these cases, however, lacked the wide-spread guerrilla activity and the fluid military operations which make Vietnam's situation so difficult. Moreover, in neither of these situations was the indigenous government so weak and so disorganized as is presently the case in Vietnam.

American economic aid finances the "other war" in Vietnam. It supplies the civilian imports—cement, fertilizer, petroleum, industrial machinery and raw materials—required to maintain minimal stability in the hyper-inflated economy. It also provides the re-

sources for the Revolutionary Development Program, the Vietnamese government's pacification effort to demonstrate to the rural people its concern with their security against Viet Cong attack and its interest in their well-being. Care and resettlement of the refugees from areas of military operation; numbering almost a million persons, is another major Vietnamese activity largely maintained through United States aid. Substantial sums are also being spent to enlarge port facilities, and to improve the country's public administration, education, health and agricultural services.

Until military and political developments end widespread insecurity and guerrilla infiltration in Vietnam, the economic aid program in that country can be little more than an emergency relief operation. If peace and political stability are established, Vietnam will face a very large problem of restoring war damage. But the country's basic agricultural productivity should make possible a rapid resumption of rice and rubber exports—its principal earners of foreign exchange. Industrial production, which had made promising beginnings during happier days, can be revived. While the people have endured great suffering, the nation's human resources will have benefitted by the health and educational services that have been expanded through American aid even during the war period. Assuming that something other than a Chinese satellite emerges after the end of hostilities, the Vietnamese will undoubtedly look to the United States for the continuation of a large-scale program of economic reconstruction.³

THAILAND

American economic relationships with Thailand have been heavily influenced by the United States effort to contain Communist Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. However, the role of American economic assistance in this country is much more marginal than in Vietnam.

³ President Johnson foreshadowed such a postwar program for all of Southeast Asia in his Johns Hopkins speech in April, 1965.

⁴ *Overseas Business Report*, United States Department of Commerce, July, 1967.

During the past decade, Thailand has enjoyed the highest rate of economic growth of any nation in the region—an eight per cent estimated increase in gross national product in 1966. Her agricultural production and foreign exchange reserves have risen substantially. Bangkok is a boom town, even to complaints about the shortage of domestic servants and the lack of automobile parking space. American private investments in Thailand are now approximately \$100 million.⁴ American military expenditures, especially for the construction of bases for the joint use of United States and Thai forces, have added to the country's prosperity. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has made large loans to Thailand and the economic aid programs of non-United States donors and international organizations are expected to provide about two-thirds of the external capital required for development in Thailand over the next five years.

The Thais face a problem of Communist-supported insurgency in the northeastern part of their country, adjacent to the Laotian frontier. This is the poorest section of Thailand, to which the central government traditionally has devoted little attention. The largest single activity financed under the United States economic aid program is the improvement of rural security in this area through the training and equipment of police and border control forces. Other AID projects are designed to expand agricultural, health and educational services in the northeast and to encourage greater civic participation in local governments.

The rationale for American aid grants of about \$40 million annually to Thailand is strategic and political rather than economic need. The country has resources to carry the high priority security costs in the northeast without external assistance. But the Thais expect the United States to share the expense of their counterinsurgency program, especially since they have permitted the use of Thai territory as a base for American air operations and have supplied some Thai forces for combat in Vietnam.

THE PHILIPPINES

Americans should be very modest about their success in helping the Philippines achieve economic progress. It is true that the Japanese occupation and the hostilities involved in liberation caused great loss of Philippine lives and property. But the war has been over for 22 years, and the United States granted the Philippines over \$800 million for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the postwar period. Subsequent American economic aid has amounted to about another \$400 million in grants, loans and agricultural commodities, together with very substantial amounts of technical assistance. Private American investment has increased from \$149 million in 1950 to an estimated \$529 million in 1965. The islands have significant natural resources and a population whose literacy rate is the highest in Southeast Asia.

Despite these favorable factors, the current growth of per capita gross national product is only about 4.5 per cent annually, little more than half the present rate of Thailand and only 75 per cent of Malaysia's. The increasing disparity of living standards between urban and rural areas has been a most critical factor in the Philippines. Agricultural productivity has been neglected and has failed to keep up with the growth of the population. The per-acre yield of rice is lower than in any major rice-producing nation; the government has been forced to import hundreds of thousands of tons of rice when the country has the land and the manpower to feed itself. Rural distress has led to unrest and revival of insurgency.

The director of the AID mission has testified that the progress of the country is not impeded by any shortage of assistance funds, but that the critical factor is the inadequate performance of the Philippine government.⁵ For this reason, United States economic aid in 1966 was limited to \$2.6 million, primarily in technical assistance. American officials are hopeful that the agreement reached by Presi-

dents Johnson and Ferdinand Marcos in September, 1966, will give impetus to essential reform and self-help measures, especially in rural areas.

LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND BURMA

For over ten years, the United States has maintained the economy of Laos through large-scale economic assistance amounting to about \$60 million annually. This small, economically primitive country, which has been characterized as more of a geographical expression than a nation, forms a buffer between Communist China and North Vietnam, and Thailand. The eastern part of Laos is under the control of the Communist Pathet Lao, who are opposed to the central government and are strongly supported by North Vietnamese troops and equipment. The country has little long-range prospect of supporting itself, except as part of some larger federation.

American assistance, in addition to financing Laos' imports and subsidizing the governmental budget, has had to supply the needs of 250,000 refugees from Pathet Lao areas. It has also provided technical assistance in education and in agricultural development. The AID program and the additional economic help currently supplied by France, the United Kingdom and Japan represent primarily a holding operation in which the very heavy aid burden is justified by the country's strategic location rather than by prospects of economic development or even of viability. The future of Laos will be determined essentially by the outcome of the war in Vietnam.

Cambodia is an agricultural nation, underpopulated by Southeast Asian standards and self-sufficient in food. French-owned rubber plantations are the major source of the country's foreign exchange. Cambodian-American trade has been very limited and there are no significant private United States investments in the country. From 1955 to 1963, United States economic assistance provided an extensive program of technical aid in education, health and agriculture, financed the construction of a major highway and other public works, and supplied the economic sup-

⁵ Testimony of Wesley C. Haroldson, *Hearings on Rural Development*, Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April, 1967, p. 413.

port of the Cambodian armed forces. The French also maintained a substantial assistance program especially for the construction of a seaport, for secondary education and for agricultural development. During the latter part of this period the Cambodians also received assistance, particularly for small-scale industrial development, from the Communist Chinese and from the U.S.S.R.

In 1963, Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with the United States and terminated the economic aid program because her chief of state, Prince Sihanouk, believed that Americans were involved in South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodian territory and that the Central Intelligence Agency was attempting to oust him. An expanded program of French aid has provided the principal external support for the Cambodian economy since that time, but the country has achieved little growth in recent years.

Burma presents a picture of economic deterioration. The strongly socialist and xenophobic government has nationalized the country's economic structure. Exports, primarily rice, hardwoods and oil, have fallen. The United States provided a limited amount of economic aid to Burma from 1950 to 1960, but this program was terminated when the Burmese administration decided not to accept further assistance from any foreign source.⁶

In contrast to Cambodia and Laos, Burma is a country with very substantial possibilities for economic growth. The country has good agricultural land and climate, large forests, rich mineral resources and natural waterways. The supply of managerial and skilled workers is limited, but this deficiency can be remedied through education. However, Burma has not yet solved her problems of internal security nor has she established a viable economic and social system or the administrative capability necessary for the nation's development.

INDONESIA

Indonesia is beginning to emerge from po-

⁶ *The New York Times* of November 1, 1967, reported that the Communist Chinese economic aid mission in Burma was being terminated. This group was concerned with implementation of the loan the Chinese made to Burma in 1961.

litical and economic chaos, following the end of President Sukarno's regime and of his policies of hostility to the United States, close relationships with Communist China, conflict with Malaysia, and neglect of the nation's economy. As the most populous nation in Southeast Asia with great natural resources and potential for development, Indonesia now looks to the United States and other economically advanced countries for the assistance that will enable her to reestablish her economy and move into a period of growth. Sukarno's successors have inherited a desperate internal economic situation and an overwhelming burden of foreign debt; they must create the stability that will encourage foreign public and private investors to provide the capital required for progress.

Over the period from 1949 to 1963, the United States furnished a total of \$278 million in economic assistance to Indonesia under AID and its predecessor agencies. In addition, \$262 million worth of food and fibers were supplied under the agricultural commodity program, and substantial loans were made by the Export-Import Bank. After Sukarno's fall, a \$10-million emergency loan was made to finance spare parts required to restart industrial production.

In effect, the United States is beginning over again in Indonesia. It has announced that it will limit American assistance, including agricultural commodities, to about one-third of the total aid supplied by all non-Communist countries. It has strongly supported a multilateral approach to Indonesia's problems, through which the country's Free World creditors, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the new Asian Development Bank would reach agreement with Indonesia on stabilization measures, economic policies conducive to development and the amounts and types of external aid.

Given the interest of a large number of other potential donors—Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Canada and Australia—it seems possible that sufficient external assistance can be mobilized to finance the critical period immediately

ahead. Whether the present Indonesian regime will be able to carry through the internal tasks involved in the nation's economic rehabilitation is still problematic. The government has taken some courageous steps in this direction, but the country's problems are very grave.

MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

Malaysia and Singapore are in a much better economic situation than are the other countries of Southeast Asia. Their per capita gross national products are far above those of their neighbors and they have maintained substantial rates of economic growth. Singapore has received no American economic assistance and Malaysia has benefitted primarily from relatively small Export-Import Bank loans and loans for agricultural commodities.

Malaysia's prosperity and progress depend heavily on her exports of rubber and tin. The world prices of both these commodities have declined and the future outlook for natural rubber is not bright. The government has undertaken a program of agricultural expansion and diversification, but this will take time and additional capital. Malaysia's conservative economic policies make her attractive to private investors; while American investments are only about \$60 million, if the nation remains stable much of the necessary capital may be forthcoming from private sources in the United States, Japan and Europe. Some part, however, will have to be supplied from multilateral and binational governmental loans.

Singapore is essentially an urban trading center. Her growth—in fact her continued existence—will depend on the expansion of entrepot and trading activities, and on her ability to manufacture for export. Like Malaysia, Singapore needs loan capital from private and public sources.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Americans have a basic bias in favor of regional economic integration. Perhaps we subconsciously feel that what was good for our 13 colonies must be good for the quite different situation on other continents. And

it is evident that in today's world, nations of modest size and resources have only limited possibilities for development unless they enter into cooperative arrangements with their neighbors for maximizing the specialized economic capacities of each. The United States has strongly supported the European Common Market and, more recently, somewhat parallel plans for Central and Latin America.

The economies of the Southeast Asian countries are generally similar to one another, rather than complementary. They are all basically agricultural. While some produce specialized commodities, such as rubber or tin, these products are not major imports of neighboring nations. Thus the possibilities of regional economic integration based on specialized division of labor are very limited, at least over the short term. Nevertheless, the countries have begun to collaborate on some economic problems of common interest to all of them.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), whose membership extends from Japan to Iran, provides a regional forum for discussion and research on problems of economic growth and for the coordination of United Nations technical assistance. The Mekong Basin Committee, whose work involves 25 countries and 12 United Nations agencies, made substantial progress in planning the development of that great riverine system, even at a time when Cambodia, one of the participating nations, had broken diplomatic relations with two other members, Thailand and Vietnam. Several cooperative economic development projects, especially in technical education, have been initiated under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and will be carried on in the future by the more inclusive Council of Southeast Asian Ministers of Education. Other specialized regional groups are being established in agriculture and transportation. On a broader basis, the recently formed Association of Southeastern Asian Nations, composed of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, may develop a political foundation for economic cooperation on a regional basis.

THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The relations between the countries of the area and the major donors of economic aid are an important field for regional economic collaboration. The Mekong Committee's work involves some elements of this character, but the principal regional vehicle for the future development of this concept is the Asian Development Bank. This new intergovernmental institution, which came into being in August, 1966, represents the realization of proposals which originated in ECAFE in 1963. Following President Johnson's endorsement, in his Johns Hopkins speech of April, 1965, the idea was shepherded through a long series of multilateral and national negotiations under the leadership of Eugene Black, former head of the World Bank. The Asian Bank's initial membership includes 21 Asian countries, extending from Iran to Western Samoa. The non-Asian members are 10 European nations, Canada and the United States. The bank is headquartered in Manila and its first president is Japanese.

The purpose of the bank is to foster economic growth by promoting investment in the developing countries of Asia. It is to make loans for development projects and programs to supplement other sources of credit; special emphasis will be placed on loans for important regional or subregional purposes. The bank will also provide technical assistance in the formulation of development programs and in expanding trade.

The United States has strongly supported the Asian Bank as a major source of the capital required for the economic development of the region. It has regarded this new institution as one way of demonstrating its concern with the constructive works of peace when it was devoting such enormous sums to the war in Vietnam. It has also underscored the importance of the Asian character of the enterprise as a nucleus for broader forms of economic, and possibly political, cooperation in the future.

The immediate utility of this new institution for the countries of Southeast Asia should not be over-sold. The bank will represent only a limited resource for them, at least in

the short run. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (and possibly Singapore) would appear to be good prospects for the bank's ordinary or "hard" loans. The other countries have very limited capacity to service additional external debt at the current "hard" interest rates of from five to six per cent. Moreover, the competition for the bank's loans from countries in other parts of Asia will limit the proportion of its resources that can be devoted to the Southeastern nations.

The bank's special lending activities hold more promise for an economically weaker nation in the Southeast. Concessional loans may make it possible for such a nation to secure financing for high priority development projects, with reasonable anticipation that over an extended period of time its economy will be restored to such a point that it can service and repay the debt.

The ability of the bank to provide these "soft" or concessional loans will depend upon the willingness of the economically advanced countries to supply it with additional funds for special lending operations.

The question of what part of its total economic aid for Southeast Asia should be funneled through the bank will be an important issue for the United States. The bank's subscribed capital will not be large enough to replace any significant portion of the present bilateral American assistance to the countries of this area. Further, there is a strong segment of American officialdom which favors bilateral arrangements as affording the greater leverage to the United States in securing a desirable *quid pro quo* for concessional loans.

For the immediate future, the bank's pri-

(Continued on page 52)

Prior to 1963, when he joined the University of Pittsburgh, **Alvin Roseman** served in administration of local, state, federal and international programs. Among the positions he held are: U.S. Representative to the U.N. agencies at Geneva, Chief of the International Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, and Regional Director of the International Cooperation Administration for the Far East.

As this specialist evaluates the military situation in Vietnam, "Barring some unexpected development, such as the intervention of Chinese troops or a sudden willingness on Hanoi's part to suspend its aid to the Viet Cong, the prospect is for United States operations to continue to expand for a substantial number of years." Is progress being made? "... the only basis for any real optimism is the hope for a snowballing effect, a progressive collapse of the Viet Cong organization, the beginning of which is not yet evident."

The Military Commitment in Southeast Asia

BY RICHARD DUDMAN

Washington Correspondent, St. Louis Post-Dispatch

IN THE CONTINUING debate over the war in Vietnam, one of the main justifications has been that the United States must keep a promise made by three Presidents to help South Vietnam defend her independence. On the other side of the argument, however, is the fact that the same three Presidents also promised that the United States would avoid a major land war on the Asian mainland.

Keeping the first pledge, we are told, has meant breaking the second. Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy rejected the recommendations of some of their principal advisers and avoided committing American combat troops in Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson, despite his 1964 campaign promises, accepted the advice to intervene in force and began deploying a United States buildup that now has reached 500,000 men and is backed up by more than 100,000 additional troops in Thailand and Laos and offshore aboard the carriers, de-

stroyers, cruisers and, soon, a battleship of the United States navy.

This is the new road that the United States has taken in Southeast Asia. In taking it, the United States has made a heavy military commitment to fill part of the vacuum left by the successive withdrawal of the Dutch, the French and the British.

Whether, as the Communist-led threat to South Vietnam increased, Eisenhower and Kennedy would have acted in the same way is a moot question. In February, 1954, when a last French effort to defeat the Viet Minh was fast collapsing, President Eisenhower said that "no one could be more bitterly opposed to getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region than I am," and that he could not "conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get heavily involved now in an all-out war in any of these regions, particularly with large units." But by the end of 1966, he was saying that the United States ought to be "putting in the kind of military strength we need to win," and he would not exclude the use of nuclear weapons.¹

Shortly before his death, Kennedy said clearly that the conflict must not become an

¹ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 250, 253; *U.S. News & World Report*, November 7, 1966, p. 42.

American war. In a television interview, he said:

In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam—against the Communists.

But a moment later, in the same interview, he gave present-day practitioners of selective quotation the evidence they have needed to make a case that Kennedy would have supported the present massive American involvement. He said:

But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. . . . This is a very important struggle even though it is far away. We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.²

However they might have acted later, Eisenhower and Kennedy both practiced caution and economy in involving the United States in Southeast Asia. They relied on military assistance and military advisory teams to support regimes that were considered pro-Western, or potentially so, in South Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. In addition, and certainly with presidential approval, the Central Intelligence Agency was employing some of its "dirty tricks," supplying dissident factions, assisting attempted coups and the like, in countries where regimes were considered more neutral toward Moscow and Peking than toward Washington, such as Indonesia, Burma and, at one point, Singapore.

At the same time, America's military strength in the region was kept offshore—in the Seventh Fleet and in such bases as Okinawa, Subic Bay in the Philippines, the air and naval bases in Japan and the Strategic Air Command's base on Guam.

CAUTIOUS POLICY

The top leadership of the United States military generally approved this cautious ap-

² Interview with Walter Cronkite, Columbia Broadcasting Company, September 2, 1963.

proach, although a notable exception was Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who joined Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in advocating a major United States military intervention in 1954 to rescue the French in Indochina. Among those who moved successfully to block their plan was Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who reportedly argued that the United States could not intervene in Indochina without allies and forced Dulles to admit that he had not as yet even consulted them.

The most effective opposition to intervention came from General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, and General James M. Gavin, Army Chief of Plans and Development, both of whom later became outspoken critics of President Johnson's expansion of the war. They concluded that the United States could hold Indochina but that it was not worth the price. Gavin reported that an army team of experts had found that the operation would require eight infantry divisions and about 35 engineer battalions. Ridgway told Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont that, even if 2,000,000 men were sent to Vietnam, they would be "swallowed up." Ridgway wrote later that "we very nearly found ourselves involved in a bloody jungle war in which our nuclear capability would have been almost useless."

In that period, Senator John F. Kennedy appeared briefly as a "hawk." He told the Senate on March 9, 1954, two months before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, that "the security of French Indochina is vital to the security of all South Asia." He defended the sending of United States technicians to Vietnam to assist the French. He opposed the prospective partition of Vietnam as "the first step toward the seizure of complete control in that area by Communist forces."

But in another speech a month later, he said he considered United States military intervention "virtually impossible in the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina" without the support of the armed forces of other nations and the masses of the Vietnamese people. It was in that speech

that he said, "I am frankly of the belief that no amount of military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, 'an enemy of the people' which has the sympathy and covert support of the people."³

Most of the top military leaders felt so strongly against going through any repetition of the Korean War that they came to be called the "Never Again" Club. Roger Hilsman, who served under President Kennedy as Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and later as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has written that the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and even the Joint Chiefs themselves opposed any ground war in Asia and particularly any *limited* ground war in Asia. Hilsman wrote that "the 'Never Again' view seemed to be that if force were to be used at all it should be used all-out—striking at the sources of enemy power." "The general thrust of their memoranda," he wrote, "seemed to imply that they were demanding an advance commitment from the President that, if they agreed to the use of American force and there were any fighting at all, then there would be no holds barred whatsoever—including the use of nuclear weapons."⁴

THE "HAWKS"

Along with these opposing or intermittently reluctant views, there were those who wanted military intervention from the start of the Kennedy Administration and have been active in managing, promoting and defending the escalating American involvement. One of the interventionists was General Maxwell D. Taylor, whom President Kennedy named chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later ambassador to South Vietnam. He now is a special consultant to President Johnson, apparently assigned as a high-level trouble-

shooter and promoter in connection with the Vietnamese war. Another is Walt W. Rostow, who was head of the State Department's Policy Planning Council in the Kennedy administration and later succeeded McGeorge Bundy as President Johnson's principal special assistant for national security affairs.

A SPECIAL MISSION

President Kennedy sent Taylor and Rostow to Vietnam in October, 1961, as heads of a special mission to recommend future United States policy there. They recommended sending to South Vietnam an initial force of 10,000 regular American ground troops, disguised as flood control workers to avoid obvious violation of the troop limitation in the Geneva agreements. Hilsman says⁵ they accepted the possibility that as many as six full divisions might eventually be required, their mission being to block regular North Vietnamese forces from invading the South and to guard the northern frontier against infiltrators while the South Vietnamese dealt with the guerrillas in the rear.

In rejecting the proposal to send combat forces, Kennedy worried even then about the emphasis being put on what was only a trickle of aid from the North. Hilsman quotes him:

No matter what goes wrong or whose fault it really is, the argument will be that the Communists have stepped up their infiltration and we can't win unless we hit the North. Those trails are a built-in excuse for failure and a built-in argument for escalation.⁶

Part of Taylor's report was made public by President Johnson in early 1967 in the midst of one of the debates over the United States bombing of North Vietnam. The passage showed that Taylor had advised President Kennedy in 1961 that "it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south."⁷

Another of the men who now has one of

³ For a detailed review of this critical period, see Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power* (New York: Viking Press, 1967), pp. 30-41.

⁴ Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 129.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

⁷ Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Public Information Series, released March 2, 1967.

the leading roles in carrying on the Vietnam war, General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, set forth his views on the nature of the conflict in a speech at Fordham University in November, 1962. He said that what the United States was committed to support in Vietnam was "military action." He said: "Despite the fact that the conflict is conducted as guerrilla warfare, it is nonetheless a military action. . . . It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military."⁸

Such was the advice taken by President Johnson, despite all the warnings and pledges against involving the United States in a ground war on the Asian mainland and against widening the conflict by attacking North Vietnam. Exactly when he decided to accept this course of escalation is a matter of conjecture, but the formal Administration decision seems to have been taken in December, 1964, when Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington for a high-level strategy conference. A big step in that direction must have been taken the previous June 23, when Taylor was appointed ambassador. It will always be debated whether the Administration had actually embarked on an escalation course before Lyndon Johnson defeated Barry Goldwater, in November, 1964, on what was above all else an anti-escalation platform.⁹

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

The immediate cause of the full-scale United States military intervention and escalation in 1965 was that the Saigon government was continuing to lose to the Viet Cong, just as it had been losing under President Ngo

Dinh Diem in the period before his overthrow and assassination in November, 1963.

More fundamentally, there was the insistence by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Rostow and others that the real enemy was Hanoi and, behind it, Peking and ultimately Moscow. The war as they saw it was part of a long-term and supremely important struggle to contain Communist expansionism. They saw Vietnam as the current test of the Communist strategy of promoting "wars of national liberation," the first of a row of dominoes that could include underdeveloped nations not only in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America.

Rusk, who had been deeply impressed with the danger of Chinese Communist expansionism since his service as Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs toward the end of the Truman Administration, gave this thesis new emphasis in his press conference October 12, 1967. He declared that the American intervention in Vietnam was part of a "vitally important" effort to help the free nations of Asia brace themselves against the threat, in a decade or two, of "a billion Chinese on the mainland, armed with nuclear weapons." The result could be "catastrophe for all mankind" if the United States abandoned its treaty obligations, specifically the SEATO agreement, and let South Vietnam be taken over by the Communist regime in Hanoi.

However, the United States obligation under the SEATO treaty—to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event of armed attack, and to consult with the other parties on measures to be taken in the event of a lesser threat—seems to have been invoked as an afterthought. When the daily bombing of North Vietnam began in February, 1965, the published reason was retaliation for terrorist attacks against U.S. forces. A month after the regular bombing raids started, a State Department memorandum of justification did not refer to the SEATO treaty.¹⁰

CHRONIC OVER-OPTIMISM

If a theory of global confrontation with communism has been one factor in the deep-

⁸ Quoted by Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

⁹ For details that suggest the timing and mechanics of this decision, see Theodore Draper, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV, and John McDermott, "Crisis Manager," in the *New York Review*, Sept. 14, 1967.

¹⁰ Reprinted in *Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam* (third revised edition), Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 145-148. This is a useful compilation of public documents and transcripts of pertinent speeches and press conferences.

ening United States involvement on the Asian mainland, another has been a chronic over-optimism, a consistent failure to foresee what that involvement would cost in terms of effort, manpower, money and casualties.

The most obvious scapegoat for this obvious underestimation of the costs is Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. His repeated public statements that the situation was improving and that the withdrawal of United States troops soon could begin are said to have reflected his private advice in government strategy meetings. One official who has attended many such sessions says that, as the troop buildup progressed, McNamara always had a numerical answer as to the number of troops that would be required to finish the job—a number that kept increasing, from 25,000 to 40,000 to 100,000, to 200,000 and on upward.

A more general reason for chronic over-optimism at the top level of government has been a built-in tendency to accentuate the favorable and minimize the unfavorable. Among both the military and the civilian organizations, there has been a bias in favor of "positive reporting," meaning emphasis on progress being made rather than on past mistakes and obstacles lying ahead.

To cite a single example, most authorities agree that the "body count" of enemy dead is exaggerated by the widespread practice of counting the body of every man, woman and child as a Viet Cong. A high-ranking information officer has explained candidly: "In this war, there are no dead suspects. When they are dead, they are all V.C."

More serious has been the official underestimation of enemy stamina and morale among the South Vietnamese Viet Cong as well as in North Vietnam. The official view that the Viet Cong rank and file are the unwilling pawns of foreign aggression, recruited and held by terror alone, cannot account for their fighting spirit, which many American military men say far exceeds that of the South Vietnamese government troops.

American strategy, moreover, may well be fundamentally in error. Some well-informed critics believe that the widening system of

uprooting the population of an area, deliberately creating thousands of refugees and turning their former home ground into a free strike zone; together with the largely indiscriminate use of bombs, napalm, defoliants and artillery, actually runs counter to the basic objective of nation-building.

As the war has expanded and has become Americanized, the pride of the service branches has become deeply involved. Pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more bombing and more troops can be explained largely in terms of their determination not to lose a war—even in a situation where military victory would be no guarantee of political success.

The situation has led Senator Eugene J. McCarthy of Minnesota to suggest, perhaps not entirely in jest, that in any future military operation of this sort one of the service branches be left on the sidelines, so that its pride will not be involved and it thus can criticize the others. Unanimity of the Joint Chiefs has been a natural result of full-scale United States involvement in Vietnam.

EFFECTS ON ASIAN NATIONS

In considering the effect of the massive United States campaign on the mainland of Asia, one must note at once the marked lack of enthusiasm on the part of most Asians. Of the SEATO powers—except for the relatively small troop commitments from Australia and New Zealand—substantial help has come only from United States aid clients. South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand demand and get additional aid each time they agree to deploy additional troops.

The three biggest nations of non-Communist Asia—Japan, India and Indonesia—have provided little or no help with the war; except for occasional restrained statements of support from the Japanese government, they seem generally opposed to the American military intervention and fearful of further American escalation.

The argument is often offered that the anti-Communist coup and purge in Indonesia in 1965 took place because its leaders knew that the United States was standing firm in

Vietnam. The thesis was never particularly persuasive, since the generals who engineered the coup and directed the purge began their efforts in reaction to an attempted pro-Communist coup. The generals were fighting for their lives regardless of what was happening far away on the Asian mainland. When the new Indonesian government reiterated its support for "the struggle of the Vietnamese people against United States military intervention," the thesis became even less persuasive.

Malaysia, much closer to the war and supposedly a beneficiary of the American effort, has declined to provide any of her own troops.

Laos, deeply involved in a low-key but chronic mixture of civil war and resistance to North Vietnamese invaders, has apparently refused to permit the United States to extend its anti-infiltration barrier in northern South Vietnam across Laos to the Thai border to cut the network of routes known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. A substantial United States military assistance and advisory operation, run by the Central Intelligence Agency and financed by the Agency for International Development, is permitted only so long as not much is said publicly about it.

Cambodia remains sturdily neutralist, although there have been some signs of renewed friendliness toward the United States and of growing friction with Peking. There have been fewer American complaints lately about the alleged use of Cambodian territory as a Viet Cong sanctuary. However, this is not because the United States thinks the problem has ended, but because there is more to gain by improving relations with Cambodia than by repeating futile complaints.

Troop assistance from non-Communist Asian nations has lagged from the start. Recent modest increases have not been sufficient to counter effectively the charge that American boys are fighting the war and Asian boys are not.

Aside from South Vietnam herself, the troop contributions now total: South Korea, 48,000; Australia, 8,000; New Zealand, 546; Thailand, 2,200; the Philippines, 2,000. Thailand let it be known unofficially that she

had agreed to increase her force to 20,000; but Premier Thanom Kittikachorn later said that additional United States aid commitments pledged in return had been deemed insufficient and would require further negotiations.

A bit of arithmetic shows what the figures would be if Asian nations provided troops in the same proportion to their populations as the United States, with its 500,000 men in South Vietnam. South Korea would be providing about 68,000; Australia, 27,500; New Zealand, 6,500; Thailand, 72,000, and the Philippines, 78,000.

Thailand, more and more, has been brought into a major and public role as a privileged American sanctuary in the war. From a system of air bases that are nominally Thai but actually American, about 80 per cent of the bombing attacks are launched against North Vietnam. A huge naval base and airfield nearing completion at Sattahip on the Gulf of Bangkok, connected by a modern highway with northeast Thailand, soon will provide support for a second front if such an expansion of ground operations should be ordered.

Barring some unexpected development, such as the intervention of Chinese troops or a sudden willingness on Hanoi's part to suspend its aid to the Viet Cong, the prospect is for United States operations to continue to expand for a substantial number of years.

It is clear from testimony in various congressional hearings in recent months that General William C. Westmoreland, the United States commander in Vietnam, wants additional troops, considerably beyond the 525,000 scheduled for mid-1968. The Administration's formula has been that Westmoreland's requests are always given urgent consideration and that his needs are always met. What he asks for and what he needs are not considered necessarily identical. The current ceiling thus is a compromise, described as an "interim" figure that will be reconsidered when the buildup has reached that point.

Various government indices, such as estimated enemy casualties and increasing enemy defections, show progress, but only at a slow

pace. Observers differ as to whether the often-sighted "light at the end of the tunnel" has really appeared or whether the situation in South Vietnam remains a stalemate. In any case, the only basis for any real optimism is the hope for a snowballing effect, a progressive collapse of the Viet Cong organization, the beginning of which is not yet evident.

Meanwhile, there is deepening concern among many who have supported the Administration's policy in Vietnam that the United States has become over-committed in that one area. In hearings on the subject before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee early in 1967, it was brought out that more troops probably would be needed in Vietnam and that any sizeable increase would mean mobilizing the reserves.

There was testimony about the burden of the present level, too. The navy acknowledged that the Atlantic Fleet had suffered a "degradation of combat readiness" in the loss of experienced personnel pulled out for assignment to Southeast Asia.

At one point, the chairman, John Stennis of Mississippi, a judicious man, widely respected, and a strong supporter of the Administration in Vietnam, expressed doubts:

I believe that we are overcommitted now, if called on for an appreciable combat period in addition to Vietnam [he said]. And I am tremendously impressed with the fact that a little country like North Vietnam can tie up so many of our men, so much of our Army, Navy and Air Force and everything else, in spite of the very high quality. It is an eye-opener to me, just as a layman. I voted glibly for things around here in the 'fifties to guarantee this and guarantee that. I am certainly one that did not realize how hard it was going to be to carry them out, and how little help we were going to get.¹¹

A group of senators headed by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, returning from a tour of Southeast Asia in 1963,

¹¹ "Worldwide Military Commitments," hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), Part 2, p. 133.

¹² "Vietnam and Southeast Asia," a Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 1963), p. 19.

¹³ *The Washington Post*, Oct. 22, 1967.

foresaw a tendency toward overcommitment even then. After mentioning Chinese hostility and the reluctance of friendly nations to help as factors contributing to the United States involvement in the region, they said:

It should also be noted, in all frankness, that our own bureaucratic tendencies to act in uniform and enlarging patterns have resulted in an expansion of the United States commitment in some places to an extent which would appear to bear the remotest relationship to what is essential or even desirable in terms of United States interests.¹²

Such views as these—and they are widely held in Congress and in the nation at large as the expanding war continues—may mean that the United States eventually will face a difficult choice in charting future policy in Vietnam. Barring the unexpected, the choice may lie between many more years of fighting on the mainland of Asia, using as many as 1,000,000 or more American troops or, as an alternative, a withdrawal of one kind or another.

There was little immediate enthusiasm for Walter Lippmann's proposal in October, 1967, for an American pull-back from the Asian mainland and a decision that Australia and New Zealand be regarded as the proper forward bases of American power in the Pacific.¹³

But his statement of the case for this extreme solution presented a reasonable version of one of the distasteful alternatives that may shortly confront the United States in Southeast Asia. The most likely other course, also increasingly distasteful, is a long ground war on the mainland with no foreseeable limit in time or cost. The middle ground between these two, if it ever really existed, is rapidly disappearing.

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Noting that the war in Vietnam is apparently becoming "unlost," and that a judicious reapportionment of American political and military effort should now be undertaken, this observer notes that "This century's crucial political challenge will, henceforth, be who controls post-colonial, independent Asia, how it is organized, and whether it can become stable and peaceful rather than remain divided and volatile."

The Stakes in Vietnam

By KENNETH T. YOUNG
President, The Asia Society

TAKING THE LONG VIEW, Vietnam is the hinge of Southeast Asia. In turn, the outcome in Southeast Asia will swing the direction of forces throughout Asia. Then, perhaps more relevantly than can be realized now, Asia's eventual inclination will point the way toward a global balance. Such a balance will gradually emerge in a few decades from the interaction of the establishment of Asian power, China's reconciliation with Asia, and the retraction of American overpresence from Asia. That is what is at stake today in Vietnam.*

This important linkage of Vietnam, Southeast Asia and all Asia in the evolution of a new world order is certainly not easy to visualize, especially when it is obscured by the intense focus on Vietnam and the inadequate American sense of time and future perspective. Like the little piece of glass on the balcony of the Red Fort in Agra reflecting the grand Taj Mahal dominating the skyline a few miles away, Vietnam mirrors in capsule the outlines of Asia's struggles. With world politics becoming global, it will be Asia's role to form the makeweight of a new global equilibrium, and Vietnam's role to provide its mainspring.

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as representing the views of The Asia Society.

As Asia goes, so goes the world in the twentieth century, it is sometimes said. Since 1941, the United States has been involved in fighting three land wars over Asia. This century's crucial political challenge will, henceforth, be *who* controls post-colonial, independent Asia, *how* it is organized, and *whether* it can become stable and peaceful rather than remain divided and volatile.

Asia is mankind's other half in numbers. Just 30 years from now, Asia's population of three billion persons—a staggering concentration of human beings—will equal or surpass the size of all of humanity today! But it is the critical mass of Asia—not just its hugeness—that generates Asia's political voltage and Vietnam's impact in the world. Seven of the world's ten largest and potentially most powerful nations are in the Asian-Pacific region: China, India, the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, Indonesia and Pakistan. This critical mass of peoples, resources, stresses, ambitions and energies—packed together in time and space, muzzle to missile—requires not only containment by restraint but convergence beyond containment.

In diverging ways, all the countries in the Asian-Pacific area are racing each other into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries on a collision course of some sort. Japan has become Asia's productive powerhouse, the third-

size industrial nation of the world but still unsure what role to play. China, with the bomb in hand, hatred toward the world, struggle at home, and nearly a billion people, must come to terms with the other half of Asia, and the rest of the world. India is the world's largest democracy, undergoing a severe transition to become viable and solvent. The smaller Asian countries—Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and each Pakistan—are important building blocks (though still weak) because they may be the manageably model size—compared to a mini-state or giant nation—for Asian stability, prosperity and continental interdependence. Meanwhile, that Westernized continent, Australia, is drawn to America, its "Far East," and to Asia, its "Near North." How will the U.S.S.R. and America treat each other, looking "down range" over Asia?

In Asia's critical mass, American stakes are (1) the growth of Asian convergence and interdependence without hostile domination by any single major power; (2) the prevention of the overturn of frontiers or governments by force of nuclear threat, mass invasion or guerrilla war; (3) the success of independent nationalist revolutions of free, peaceful choice, political reform, economic modernization and social justice; and (4) the attraction of China into an Asian system of coexistence independent of American power.

These four objectives respond to Asian trend lines and preferences. First, the Asians are taking more initiatives toward doing things their own way, following their own priorities, and forming their own associations. They want to own the ground they stand on, un beholden to any alien power. Second, responsible nationalist leaders throughout Asia realize, nevertheless, the provisional need for some outside underpinnings—military, financial, and technological. For the most part, they want the tactful and temporary American presence for a counterweight in Asia. Third, they look to the day when Asian power will eventually make possible the safe retraction of American "presence" and power from the Asian mainland. This long-range dual process of increasing Asian initiative and di-

minishing external presence will produce what Americans and Asians want: responsible Asian power. That should be Vietnam's ultimate consequence.

But, one may ask, what does Vietnam have to do with Asia's new role in world affairs and the objectives of convergence beyond containment? Why is Vietnam the hinge of Asia for opening a highway of conquest or a passage to peace? The short answer is that United States purposes in Vietnam set the stage for its long-range policies in Asia.

The United States is in Vietnam for purposes of American national interest and security, to stop aggression, support the development and integrity of South Vietnam, sustain the free, peaceful, self-determination of Vietnamese reform and nationalist revolution for the unity of all Vietnam, invigorate international institutions for keeping peace and settling disputes, and encourage the morale and cohesion of Southeast Asia. The United States is also in Vietnam to keep its promises and make good its commitments undertaken over many years to fulfill broad American objectives in Vietnam and Asia. If Americans run out on their long-standing commitments of reform with security in Vietnam, they will never be trusted again in Latin America, Europe or Asia.

What happens in Vietnam vitally affects Thailand, Laos, Burma, Malaysia and Cambodia. A workable solution in Vietnam would link together the small states of Southeast Asia and, in turn, would solder their connection west to India, north to Japan and south to Australia. During the past two decades, recognition of the United States vital national interest in Asia's strategic indivisibility has determined its stand in Vietnam. Rather than default on that interest and commitment, three Presidents each decided not to give up, but to use American diplomacy and power in three successive crises—1954, 1961 and 1965—to save South Vietnam when her very survival was at stake.

The crumbling or unravelling effect of the loss of Indochina to expansionist Communist forces has always been a key consideration in American policy. Now, if South Vietnam

goes down, leading Asian officials, especially in Southeast Asia but generally in Asia, are more convinced than they were in 1954 that the other nations in the area would have to disengage quickly from the United States presence and accommodate to the predominance of Hanoi and Peking. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore put it this way recently: "I know enough about Southeast Asia to know that the wrong kind of conclusion to the mess in Vietnam can absolutely unscramble the whole lot of us in Southeast Asia."¹ This "unscrambling" effect would not, of course, proceed all at once, in some predetermined sequence or by identical reactions, as the distorted "domino theory" erroneously visualized the process. However, a linked reaction, like bowling pins falling on several throws, would be more than likely.

It may be argued that this notion of the strategic interdependence of Asia is mechanistic, artificial and imaginary because Asia is too big, assorted and intractable to bury old feuds, build new bridges or fall like bowling pins. Moreover, it is contended, there can be no vital stake here because with no firm ground to take a stand on, Vietnam is a "quagmire in a swamp." It is indeed true that hostility, suspicion and divergence have made up much of Asia's bewildering mosaic in the post-colonial era of independence and revolution. Asia's manifold differences are obvious and pervasive, but, on the other hand, they will not necessarily prevail. Just emerging still somewhat indistinctly out of this welter of divisiveness is the new common spirit of young leadership, regional collaboration and Asian initiative. This New Asia does seek interdependence and solidarity to end rivalry and disruption. It is the wave of the future but, still struggling to build up strength, it could be blown away.

A CYCLE OF CONFIDENCE

More than money, guns or even a balance of power, the New Asia needs a long cycle of confidence to replace its dominion of fear about China. This is very real in Asia. A

potential crumbling or "unscrambling" process is indeed a phenomenon Americans need to understand and help overcome because it could nullify United States objectives.

Asian fear of engulfment by China, to use an Asian phrase, has stalked Southeast Asia since 1950, as well as since 1250 and long before that. For 2000 years a strong China has always meant troublesome adjustments and disagreeable subordination for *all* the Asian states. Therefore, since 1954, American officials have been convinced that American disengagement would generate a calamitous "shock wave" from Saigon to Singapore, and on to New Delhi and Tokyo. Today, in 1968, responsible Asian leadership is genuinely afraid that China will call the tune if the United States leaves the stage.

The Asians take the long view, unlike most Americans, and prefer to be on the side of history. Asian political psychology, sternly relevant and unsentimental, tends to emphasize the variables of power and the fluctuating directions of political forces. Following the end of European domination over Asia, many Asian nationalist leaders have concluded that only one of two "big nations"—the United States or China—could fill the vacuum of power until Asian strength has built its own permanent counterweight. Asian leader after Asian leader prefers the United States in this role of provisional counterweight, perhaps as the lesser evil, but often as a dependable, respected and generous friend. In short, Asians see the destiny of the nationalist half of Asia directly tied to the *judicious* exercise of American diplomacy and power in Asia. They realize the intricate long-run interplay of Asian buildup and eventual American retraction, the subtle relationships in Asia's interdependence, and the difficulties of achieving convergence beyond containment where the Chinese are concerned.

Calculating the flux of authority and power realistically in terms of actual strengths, national interests and probable outcomes, Asian opinion naturally wants to side with the "winner" rather than the "loser." Today, Asian leaders believe that American power will not only be the winner but will be a better gamble

¹ Television interview in Singapore, September 26, 1967.

in the long run for them than Chinese hegemony. Estimating that the direction of forces in the Asian-Pacific region is at last moving with the United States and away from mainland China, they are now encouraged and emboldened to take the risky chances and make the hard choices in domestic politics and foreign policy—as Indonesia has done—to move toward regional solidarity and pragmatic modernization. Perhaps they are arbitrary, but Asian leaders are indeed looking to Vietnam to see how the weather vane of the direction of forces in Asia is pointing. Vietnam is the barometer of their buoyancy or defeatism. That is why the United States has a vital stake in the outcome of Vietnam's political struggle.

THE CHANCE FOR CHOICE

Will Asians have the chance, and the security to assure themselves of that chance, to choose how they live, govern themselves, make mistakes, handle corruption and achieve modern progress in many diverse ways? Will the United States guarantee them the time, counted in years or decades, to build strength and ultimately generate a self-reliant Asian power without the United States around? Or, will they be forced to become subsidiaries of an Asian Communist structure? The choice today, as they see it, is between varieties of democratic nationalism and totalitarian communism, both Asian-styled. How the United States interacts with these two Asias also lies at the heart of its purpose in Vietnam, where Americans are sustaining the chance and perhaps the last chance for peaceful free choice, the ballot not the bullet, and a Vietnamese mandate for progress instead of any alien law of the gun.

The complex Asian struggle between nationalism and communism, in rough but relevant terms, is highlighted particularly in Vietnam. For more than a generation, nationalist leaders and groups have been fighting for survival against great odds to withstand the dictatorship of Ho Chi Minh and the autocracy of others. Now a new generation of young Vietnamese—students, labor leaders, farmers, soldiers, priests and even poets—is

taking over. Like most Vietnamese, they yearn for a truly Vietnamese solution of their political struggles, consistent with their heritage but in cadence with their destiny. Tortuously, they are groping for the emergence of that leadership and the crystallization of that nationalist movement which will reflect the essence of Vietnam, the aspirations of the people and the unity of the whole nation. Unfortunately, the new nationalists in Vietnam are still weak and disorganized. They need understanding and support. And they are looking to other Asians and Americans for the helping hand and compassionate heart.

If these non-Communist leaders and groups are abandoned and finally liquidated, as the Vietnamese Communists have been attempting for many years, the morale and confidence of nationalist leaders in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and Indonesia will be broken. The promise and high stakes of Vietnamese nationalism will have been destroyed. And the Vietnamese Communists will have captured the energies of the Vietnamese people and the instruments of power in all Indochina to turn against the rest of Southeast Asia in accordance with the general objectives of both Hanoi and Peking. The toughness, dynamism and unusual abilities of the Vietnamese, which many Southeast Asians know and respect, could then be harnessed to this East Asian Communist machine driving forward for political power to settle old scores, force the Americans out of Asia and become Asia's "number one."

THE WATERSHED OF COEXISTENCE

Only when Asia is at peace with itself will the world find security. None of the American stakes in Asia and Vietnam—the growth of convergence and interdependence, the cycle of confidence, the chance for a real choice—has much future if a watershed of coexistence—a buffer zone—cannot be emplaced between the two Asias. The point of impact is now Vietnam. Vietnam is the danger point now because a line of limit has been established in Korea, the Taiwan Straits

and along much of the Himalayan Massif.

Vietnam has long been the historic crossroads of cultural, economic and military confrontation in Southeast Asia. Today, there is no political intersection in the world where so many contending pressures, interests and concerns intermingle. Peking views it as the "focus of the struggle of the people of the world against United States aggression." Southeast Asians see it as the verdict determining the direction of forces for decades to come.

Vietnam, together with Laos, has become an uncontrolled intersection and the most dangerous in the interacting zone from Berlin to Seoul. There is no line of limit or buffer zone serving to keep the two main forces apart and to regulate their interaction without collision. The volatile gap without insulation in this confrontation of powerful intensities is the 17th Parallel and an indefinable area of northern Laos. All American objectives in Asia and in Southeast Asia converge at this geographic point. This is the place to set up the stop line and the traffic signals, not only to avoid a fatal collision but to regulate the contending pressures. This is a positive concept of containment by way of insulating and transforming power. There is no other place in Southeast Asia where it could be done.

Vietnam is an uninsulated crossway of high density and huge voltage. It first needs counterforce to stop the flow of arbitrary power and raw violence. Basic law and order must be put in place to hold back its violators. Once brute aggression and terrorism are restrained, new international arrangements must be negotiated to insulate disputed areas against guerrilla infiltration or military invasion and to contain and transform into constructive channels the energy of Vietnam and China. The future Asia belongs to those who can corner and reduce the intense fire fight between nationalism and communism in the villages, cities, regions and nations. A Vietnamese watershed of coexistence, founded on buffer zones, impartial peacekeeping forces, political confederation, economic exchanges, regional association and international guaran-

tees, would contain the confrontation of power and open up possibilities for peaceful convergence.

In a literal sense, the physical watershed and potential electric power grid of the far-flung Mekong River in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and both Vietnams could structure the geopolitical framework for a broad convergence in a new regional community. China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and India could pledge their mutual respect and support. A "Mekong solution" could be Asia's first really Asian demonstration project in convergence beyond containment to show the way for the Two Asias to close the gap on a continental scale and for the world at large, to unite the rich North and the poor South. A "Mekong solution" would, moreover, provide an indigenous, palatable and workable framework for the realization of broad American objectives to a far greater extent than would the European model of "neutralization" which some Americans mistakenly favor.

But there will be no watershed of coexistence nor any "Mekong solution" if South Vietnam collapses and the former Indochina falls into the hands of Hanoi. A successful Mao-Ho strategy of revolutionary political warfare to win the countryside and take over the cities would speedily move on, in many directions, after the capture of all Vietnam and the capitulation of the Americans. As the bowling pins fell, a Communist condominium *without* peaceful constructive convergence would unfold in Southeast Asia. It could easily result in grave consequences for the United States.

A Communist condominium would deny Japan her "lifeline" to Europe and the Middle East and her access to nearly a billion Asian customers. It would outflank the Indian subcontinent and separate the Pacific communication routes from the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. It would open the road to Communist aggression by seepage (as I call the "war of liberation") into Nepal, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia. In time, the United States would be denied essential access to the

Southwestern Pacific and Indian Oceans. Tensions among the seven key nations of the Asia-Pacific region would be hard to corner. There would be convergence in endless violence-making, not peace-making. Widespread restraint of freedom and much regimentation might indeed develop, even here in America. A neo-Maoist elite would rule all China—and without fear of opposition. The strategy of violent rural revolution would look like the wave of the future to poor peasants, wretched slum dwellers and disheartened intellectuals in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. In this grim but not exaggerated portent of faltering in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, China's future is also at stake.

THE ATTRACTION FOR CHINA

Will China—a quarter of mankind—hold out her hate or her hand toward the rest of the world? China's outlook may well depend on the outcome in Vietnam. As a Chinese poet asked 1,500 years ago, "The feathers of the phoenix may break, but who can tame the soul of the dragon?" China's attitude has usually been one of aloof, introverted superiority, her perspective a Sinocentric world order, and her custom the rites of submission from inferiors, not the rules of engagement with equals. China has never really joined the world, and now acts caged and hostile to everyone. The taming of China is probably what is most at stake in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. How can Peking be persuaded to live with the world and let the world live? Whether and how Peking will shift from the Maoist policy of revolutionary war on China's exclusive terms to evolutionary coexistence on reciprocal terms is one of the big stakes in Vietnam.

If Ho and Mao win there, they will feel no incentive nor any pressure to adjust to anything or negotiate. It will be the other way round. All us "barbarians" will again do the adjusting, as I have already suggested, to a unilateral Communist convergence, notwithstanding the differences in style and approach between Hanoi and Peking. But some of the leaders in Hanoi and Peking might eventually

be induced to taper off the Vietnamese war and even negotiate a peaceful compromise in reciprocal convergence. Then the chance would be slightly brighter that later Chinese leadership might favor peaceful, rational options in Asian and global politics if those options are sincerely and credibly held open.

The success of Mao Tse-tung's cardinal thesis, that armed peasant struggle in the countryside of Vietnam, and elsewhere, can seize power and revolutionize Asia and a divided world, is essential to Maoist dominance in China. If his strategy fails in Vietnam, Mao and his faction will probably fade in China and everywhere else. When younger and more pragmatic Chinese no longer listen to Chairman Mao and his "thought," they will have to choose among three options toward the outside: war, contact, or isolation. Since the first and the third, while different in scope and impact, would each have dangerous consequences for China as a nuclear power and for the world at large, our stake lies in encouraging the post-Mao Chinese, insofar as we can, to choose the middle range of contact, coexistence and cooperation in the national interest of the Chinese people.

It is at this stage in China's internal upheaval that the success of limited American political purposes in South Vietnam could prove to be rather powerful persuaders for China. Now, just as the United States stand in Vietnam and Southeast Asia begins to look a bit hopeful, Mao's Cultural Revolution coincidentally seems to be closing the door on him and opening the way eventually for new leadership. Now, more than ever, a steadfast but proportionate pursuit of the American purpose in Vietnam is essential. That will surely help persuade nationalistic pragmatists in China that China cannot impose her will on Southeast Asia or the world; that China must adjust to the realities of a planetary society, and that China needs to join Asia and the world in friendly coexistence to become the significant viable modern nation that Chinese talents and energies deserve.

If hard-pressed governments and newly emerging societies meanwhile hold the line in Southeast Asia, make good their choices of

national modernization and turn the direction of forces confidently toward Asian interdependence, a post-Mao China may opt to articulate with the rest of Asia, and a Pan-Asian cluster will slowly begin to germinate. But the seedbed is the slim coastline of Vietnam and the inland Mekong watershed of Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. Together they will render the verdict on whether American stakes are won or lost.

MEASURED EFFORT

These stakes may sound unlimited, but they do not imply unlimited means to reach them. They do not mean that the United States must be the permanent policeman of Asia or the world, or keep pumping massive aid into Asia indefinitely. Indeed, unlimited objectives sometimes are best sought by limited means and measured sequence. That is the case with Vietnam and Asia. The encouragement of interdependent Asian self-reliance, initiative and power will induce some sort of workable coexistence to be followed by a carefully-managed retraction of American power to replace the Asian vacuum and the American overpresence.

The judicious proportion of effort in a strategy related to these goals is the key at least to some modest achievements. The linkage of Vietnam, Southeast Asia and the whole continent in the Asian-Pacific Basin requires modulated and coordinated measures. It is time to reassess the American proportion of effort in Vietnam. The United States is dealing with the politics of conversion there and in Asia, not with a war of conquest or unconditional surrender. Psychological and political factors will determine the outcome for the long-range convergence beyond containment. An extension in the American sense of time, the reorganization of American agencies, the training of American experts on Asian affairs, and the mixture of diplomacy and force should be part of a national agenda for realigning United States means in Vietnam to establish an effective proportion of effort.

The most basic and most vital of American tools is the time frame. Deadlines and arbitrary schedules will not achieve Vietnamese

objectives. An extended time frame of a decade, for example, would be much more likely to bring about an acceptable truce and a workable settlement between North and South Vietnam. The establishment of some kind of coexistence in a "live and let live" atmosphere on both sides of the nationalist-Communist watershed could be negotiated if Americans made it clear that they were prepared to take "all the time in the world" to see this through. Impatient haste and constant demands for instant results will only delay the end of aggression and the establishment of peaceful arrangements.

But a new time sense also needs a reorientation of United States agencies and personnel for carrying out policy. A realignment of diplomatic, economic and military organizations is called for to meet the requirements of a political struggle and military combat completely different from anything the United States has faced before. To implement United States purposes in Vietnam and Asia, it would seem essential to train and assign "for the duration" those American men and women who have not only professional skills but deep experience in dealing with the Vietnamese and their struggle.

Unfortunately, the proportion of military effort has come to outweigh the political at a time when political factors require priority. The high level of violence and fabulous fire power could now be scaled down in both North and South Vietnam to deal with hundreds of small targets. Crowbars do not make good hornet killers. Military shields around South Vietnam's territorial and coastal perim-

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Criticizing the United States presence in Vietnam, this author asks, "Why . . . is the United States evidently resolved to continue fighting a war which appears politically aimless, militarily unpromising and morally dubious?" He suggests that "The answer is to be found in the concern for American prestige."

U. S. Misadventure in Vietnam

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

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THE POLICIES THE UNITED STATES is pursuing in Vietnam are open to criticism on three grounds: they do not serve the interests of the United States; they run counter to American interests; and the United States objectives are not attainable, if they are attainable at all, without unreasonable moral liabilities and military risks.

In order to understand the rationale underlying our involvement in Southeast Asia one must go back to the spring of 1947 when the postwar policies of the United States were formulated and put into practice—the policy of containment, the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These policies pursued one single aim by different means: the containment of communism. That aim derived from two assumptions: the unlimited expansionism of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power, and the monolithic direction and control the Soviet Union exerted over the world Communist movement.

These assumptions, in turn, were based on empirical evidence, i.e., the policies pursued by the Soviet Union at the end and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The Red Army had advanced to a distance of 100 miles east of the Rhine, and behind that line of military demarcation the Soviet Union had reduced the nations of East Europe to the status of satellites. Nothing by way of material power stood in the way of the Red Army if it were intent on taking over the nations of West Europe, all of which

had been drastically weakened by the war and in some of which, such as France and Italy, large Communist parties were ready to make common cause with the "liberators" from the East.

It was against this essentially traditional military threat that the United States policy of containment was devised. Thus it partook of the rationale which since the beginning of the Republic has informed the policies of the United States with regard to Europe: the maintenance or, if need be, the restoration of the balance of power. It was for this reason that the United States intervened in two world wars on the seemingly weaker side, and it was for the same reason that it embarked on the policy of containing the Soviet Union. The Truman doctrine, itself originally applied to a specific, geographically limited emergency concerning Greece and Turkey, transformed this traditional and geographically limited commitment into a general principle of universal application by stipulating that the United States would come to the assistance of any nation threatened by Communist aggression or subversion.

The Marshall Plan served the purpose of the policy of containment in that it tried to make the nations of West Europe immune from Communist subversion and strong enough collectively to withstand Soviet aggression by restoring them to economic health. The spectacular success of the Marshall Plan had intellectual and political consequences

similar to those of the policy of containment. The rationale underlying the Marshall Plan evolved into a general principle of American statecraft to be applied anywhere in the form of foreign aid.

It is against this background that one must consider the involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. For the modes of thought and action growing from the specific European experiences of the postwar period still dominate today the foreign policies of the United States, paradoxically enough not so much in Europe as elsewhere throughout the world. The Administration consistently justifies its Asian policies by analogy with its European experiences. The United States thinks of Asia in 1968 as it thought of Europe in 1947, and the successes of its European policies have become the curse of the policies the United States is pursuing in Asia. For the problems Americans are facing in Asia are utterly different from those they successfully dealt with in Europe two decades ago, and the political world they were facing in Europe has been radically transformed.

The active involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia is a response to the Korean War. That war was interpreted by the United States government as the opening shot in a military campaign for world conquest under the auspices of the Soviet Union. In view of this interpretation, it was consistent for the United States to defend South Korea against the North Korean Communists, as it would have defended Western Europe against the Red Army had it stepped over the 1945 line of demarcation. Similarly, it was consistent for the United States to support with massive financial and material aid the French military effort to defeat the Vietnamese Communists. When France was threatened with defeat, in 1954, it was consistent for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, then chairing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to recommend that President Dwight Eisenhower intervene with American airpower on the side of France. Finally, it was a logical application of this policy of containing communism in Asia to establish and support an anti-Communist regime in

South Vietnam, after the division of the country in 1954. However, when the disintegration of this regime became acute (roughly from 1960 onward), the United States continued this policy of containment as though the nature of world communism had not changed since 1950 and as though the political disintegration of South Vietnam posed for the United States an issue similar to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It was at this point that our policy went astray.

While it was plausible—even though it has proven to be historically incorrect—to attribute the outbreak of the Korean War to a world-wide Communist conspiracy, there is no historical evidence whatsoever to interpret in that manner what has happened in Vietnam since 1960. The period of history since Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Joseph Stalin in 1956 has been characterized by the disintegration of the Communist bloc into its national components, each pursuing to a greater or lesser degree its own particular national policy within a common framework of Communist ideology and institutions. The influence that the Soviet Union and China are still able to exert over Communist governments and movements is not the automatic result of their common Communist character, but of the convergence of national interests and of particular power relations.

COMMUNISM IN VIETNAM

This has always been true of the Vietnamese Communists. Many of them were nationalists before they became Communists, and it was only the indifference or hostility of the West that made them embrace communism. Even under the most unfavorable conditions of war with the United States, the government of North Vietnam has been able to retain a considerable measure of independence vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and China by playing one off against the other. The Vietnamese Communists are not mere agents of either the Soviet Union or China. The sources of their strength and their aims are indigenous and must be judged on their own merits.

This being the case, the professed United States war aim, "to stop communism" in South Vietnam, reveals itself as an empty slogan. It must be made concrete by raising the questions: what kind of communism is the United States fighting in South Vietnam? and what is the relationship of that communism to the United States interest in containing the Soviet Union and China? The answers to these questions reveal the unsoundness of American policy. The fate of communism in South Vietnam is irrelevant to the containment of Soviet or Chinese communism since Vietnamese communism is not controlled by either of them. The United States fight against the South Vietnamese Communists is relevant only to its relations with South Vietnam, which, even if she were governed by Communists, could not affect the balance of power in Asia.

The instruments the United States is using to achieve its aim in Vietnam are three: "counter-insurgency" and "nation-building" in the South, and the bombing of the North. These instruments have failed as they were bound to fail.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY

It is to be held as an axiom, derived from the experience of many guerrilla wars, that a guerrilla war supported, or at least not actively opposed, by the indigenous population cannot be won, short of the physical destruction of that population. In the nature of things, the guerrilla is indistinguishable from the rest of the population, and in truth the very distinction is tenuous in a situation where the guerrilla is an organic element of the social and political structure. In such a situation, everyone is in a sense a potential guerrilla. The whole population is composed of full-time guerrillas, part-time guerrillas, auxiliaries who feed, clothe and hide the combatants, make arms, build hide-outs, and carry ammunition; only a minority is permanently passive or surreptitiously hostile to the guerrillas. What the United States is facing in South Vietnam is a primitive nation-in-arms, in a war which can be won only by incapacitating the total population.

It is for this reason that "pacification," repeated time and again for almost a decade under different names and auspices, has been a consistent failure. For it is based upon the misconception that the guerrillas are an alien element within the indigenous population, who therefore can be separated from that population by an appropriate technique. A Vietnamese village is pacified only when all the men capable of bearing arms are either dead or driven away and prevented from returning. The last condition is impossible to achieve. Thus many villages have been "pacified" time and again, only to fall back under guerrilla control when the military occupation was relaxed.

In Vietnam, what makes "counter-insurgency" so futile an undertaking is the difference between the motivation of the guerrillas and that of the professional army fighting them. No professional army could have withstood the punishment Americans have inflicted on the South Vietnamese guerrillas since the beginning of 1965. It is for this reason that United States military leaders have said repeatedly that the Viet Cong were on the verge of collapse, as they would have been were they professional soldiers. But, like the Spanish and Tyrolian guerrillas fighting the armies of Napoleon, they are fanatical protagonists of an ideal—social revolution or national survival or both—and they will die rather than admit defeat. Against them fights a professional army which does its duty efficiently as well as courageously and uses "counter-insurgency" as a mechanical contrivance, a particular kind of military tactic with which to fight "unorthodox" war. However, guerrilla war is not just "unorthodox" in the technical, tactical sense, but different in quality from traditional war; hence, it cannot be "won" in the traditional sense.

THE POLITICAL WAR

The United States government recognizes implicitly the truth of this analysis when it maintains that there are two wars in South Vietnam—a military war and a political war—and that victory in the latter will be decisive. In order to win that political war,

the United States has embarked on a massive program of political, social and economic reconstruction in South Vietnam. It is the purpose of that program to establish the government of South Vietnam as a new focus that will attract the loyalties of the large mass of South Vietnamese who are indifferent to either side, as well as the disenchanted supporters of the Viet Cong. This program is up against three obstacles which, in the aggregate, appear insurmountable.

First, the government of South Vietnam is a military government and has remained so in spite of the democratic gloss which carefully circumscribed and managed elections have tried to put on it. The foundation of the government's power is the army, both in terms of the administrative structure and of what there is of loyal support. Yet the army is regarded by large masses of the population not as the expression of the popular will but as its enemy. This is so because of the oppressive behavior of the army toward the peasants and, more particularly, because there is reportedly no officer in the South Vietnamese army above the rank of lieutenant colonel who did not fight on the side of the French against his own people.

Second, this impression of an army fighting against its own people is reinforced by the massive presence of foreign armed forces without whom neither that army nor the government it supports could survive. Regardless of professed and actual American intention, the United States military presence, with its destructive economic, social and moral results for South Vietnam, appears to an ever-increasing number of South Vietnamese as an evil to be eliminated at any price. Thus our massive visible support for the government of South Vietnam, while indispensable and, in good measure, because it is indispensable, discredits that government in the eyes of the people of South Vietnam.

Finally, the hoped-for radical change in political loyalties requires radical social, economic and political reforms, especially with regard to the distribution of land. The achievement of such reforms has indeed earned the Viet Cong the allegiance of large

masses of peasants. Both in its composition and policies, the government of South Vietnam represents the interests of a small group of absentee land owners and members of the urban upper middle class who would lose their economic, social and political privileges were that government really trying to counter the social revolution of the Viet Cong with radical social reforms of its own. The United States is facing here the same dilemma which has frustrated its foreign aid policies throughout the world, more particularly in the Alliance for Progress: it is trying to achieve radical social reforms through the instrumentality of governments which have a vital interest in the preservation of the status quo.

The universally recognized weaknesses of the government of South Vietnam—corruption, inefficiency, apathy, lack of public spirit, low military performance, a staggering desertion rate—result irremediably from the nature of that government. They are not to be remedied by American appeals to the South Vietnamese government to do more for the country or to let the South Vietnamese army take over a larger share of the fighting and pacification. A government imposed on an unwilling or at best indifferent people by a foreign power to defend the status quo against a national and social revolution is by dint of its very nature precluded from doing what Americans expect it to do. That nature dooms all efforts at politically effective reconstruction.

BOMBING OF THE NORTH

The third policy the United States is pursuing in Vietnam is the bombing of the North, to win the war in the South by interdicting the influx of men and materiel from the North, and to force the government of North Vietnam to the conference table by making it too costly for it to continue the war. Both purposes derive from a faulty perception of reality. The United States assumes that what it faces in South Vietnam is the result of foreign aggression and that there would be no unmanageable trouble in the South if only, in Secretary of State Dean Rusk's often repeated phrase, North Vietnam would leave

her neighbor alone. It follows logically from this assumption that internal peace could be restored to South Vietnam if one could insulate South Vietnam from the North or compel the North to cease her assistance to the South. However, this assumption does not square with historic reality.

SOUTHERN ROOTS OF WAR

The roots of the trouble are in the South. They were deeply embedded in the nature of the Diem regime, which combined a fierce nationalism with a totalitarian defense of the economic and social status quo. Nobody doubts that the government of North Vietnam welcomed and aided and abetted the progressive disintegration of the Diem regime. But it did not cause it, nor was its support responsible for the Viet Cong's success. When, at the beginning of 1965, the government of South Vietnam was close to defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong, according to official estimates 90 per cent of the Viet Cong weapons were of American origin and the annual infiltration from the North amounted to no more than a few thousand men, mostly of Southern origin. Only a total of a few hundred were regulars of the North Vietnamese army.

Consequently, the war could not be won by bombing the North even if the bombing were more effective.

... [W]hat would happen [asks General Maxwell Taylor] if Hanoi were suddenly to disappear? Suppose everything of value in the North were destroyed; we would still have over 200,000 armed guerrillas in South Vietnam who would have to be accounted for in some way. For food they could live off the land without supplies from the North. If they avoided contact with large military forces, they could husband their weapons and ammunition stocks and maintain for a long time a low level of sustained depredations and terrorist activity. If they were determined to carry on the war, if their morale did not collapse at this disaster in the North, they could conceivably remain in action for the next ten years, or the next twenty years, and we might still be tied down by this vast guerrilla force.¹

The situation would be no different if the

¹ *Responsibility and Response* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 38.

government of North Vietnam were suddenly to collapse and to sign our peace terms on the dotted line. Who would impose these terms on the Viet Cong, who have not been defeated in the field and who continue to draw on the support or at least the indifference of large masses of the indigenous population?

It is precisely because we have been unable to win the war in the South that we continue to assume that the source of the war is in the North and that victory can be won by bombing the North. However, the day is close at hand when everything that appears to be worth bombing will have been bombed and the war in the South will still not be won. The next logical step will be the invasion of North Vietnam; for if North Vietnam is responsible for the war, then the conquest of North Vietnam will end the war. While it will not accomplish that end, it will conjure up the likelihood of a United States military confrontation with the Soviet Union or China or both. The Soviet Union has assured the United States that it will not stand idly by while the government of North Vietnam is destroyed, and China has made it clear that she will intervene, as she did in the Korean War, when a hostile army approaches her frontiers.

A LOSING ENTERPRISE

However, if the war in the South lasts long enough, the United States has a good chance of winning it. The United States is not likely to win the war in the traditional way by breaking the enemy's will to resist, but rather by killing so many enemies that there is no one left to resist. Killing in war has traditionally been a means to a psychological end. In this war, killing becomes an end in itself. The physical elimination of the enemy and victory become synonymous. Hence, the "body count," however fictitious in itself, is the sole measure of our success.

No civilized nation can wage such a war without suffering incalculable moral damage. This damage is particularly grave since the nation can realize no plausible military or political benefit which could justify this killing for killing's sake. And it is particularly pain-

ful for a nation like the United States—founded as a novel experiment in government, morally superior to those that preceded it—which has throughout its history thought of itself as performing a uniquely beneficial mission not only for itself but for all mankind.

Why, then, is the United States evidently resolved to continue fighting a war which appears politically aimless, militarily unpromising and morally dubious? The answer is to be found in the concern for American prestige. If the United States should leave Vietnam without having won a victory, so it is argued, the credibility of its commitments throughout the world would suffer, Communist revolutions throughout the world would be encouraged, and the reputation of American invincibility would be impaired.

CONTAINING CHINA

Not only does the containment of Vietnamese communism not further the interests of the United States but, paradoxical as it may seem, it is even detrimental to those interests. The United States has a legitimate interest in the containment of China and its involvement in Vietnam is frequently explained in terms of this interest. But Vietnamese nationalism has been for a millenium a barrier to the expansion of Chinese power into South-east Asia. There is no patriotic Vietnamese, North or South, Communist or non-Communist, Buddhist or Catholic, who does not regard China as the hereditary enemy of Vietnam. Yet to the degree that the United States weakens Vietnam as a national entity through the destruction of her human and material resources, it creates a political, military and social vacuum into which either the United States must move in virtual permanence or into which either the Soviet Union or China will move.

What about American prestige? Its decline because of the liquidation of United States involvement in Vietnam is a matter for speculation; its drastic decline by virtue of the involvement is a matter of fact. In the eyes of most of the world, the most powerful nation on earth is trying to force a nation of primitive peasants into submission by the massive

use of all the modern means of mass destruction (with the exception of biological and nuclear weapons) and it is unable either to win or to liquidate that war. The champion of the "free world" is protecting the people of South Vietnam from communism by destroying them. And in the process, the world is moved closer and closer to an unwinnable war with China, if not to the cataclysm of nuclear war. This is the image which the United States presents today to most of the outside world; in consequence its prestige has never been so low.

If the United States were to liquidate the war, the damage to its prestige would at least in some measure be repaired. The United States would show that it is wise and strong enough to admit a mistake and correct it. The liquidation of the misadventure need not affect its future policies. Commitments are not entered into or honored by way of precedent, nor do precedents initiate revolutions. For better or for worse, history does not operate like the Supreme Court of the United States (and even the Supreme Court has been known to disregard precedent for reasons of principle and prudence).

What the argument about prestige really amounts to is a concern for the prestige not of the United States but of those who are responsible for its involvement in Vietnam. But those who are responsible for the straits in which the nation finds itself today should bear the consequences of their ideological blindness and political and military miscalculations. They ought not to ask the nation to suffer for their false pride.

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As the war expanded after 1964, the most important issue of political debate in South Vietnam "... was the question of possible negotiations, deescalation and peace." There evolved "... an almost universal Vietnamese correlation of the United States presence with the other topics of debate such as inflation, corruption and retention of power by the military." This specialist concludes that, "In short, the United States role has become the major political issue in South Vietnam."

Politics in South Vietnam

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AN INEVITABLE PART of the *modus operandi* for each South Vietnamese government since the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem has been a promise to expand its base of support, to provide for the assembling of a body to declare some version of representative government, and to conduct some form of plebiscite(s) to ratify a new political system. In short, each regime since 1963 has professed a desire to obtain "legitimacy" for a succeeding one. The national elections of 1967 brought to power the first regime in four years that claimed it intended to remain as the government. Operating under a constitution written by an elected Constituent Assembly and directed nationally by a popularly elected executive and bicameral legislative body and locally by elected provincial, village and hamlet councils, the new government could make greater formal claim to "legiti-

macy" than any ruling group since the beginning of the French colonial era.¹

Despite this formal legitimacy, the dramatic electoral processes during 1965-1967 displayed again that there is no majority group in South Vietnam. Politics was characterized by factionalism, lack of cohesion, temporary and shifting expedient group alignments, personalized and basically non-ideologically oriented political organizations, and generally incompatible interests.²

The numerous deep-seated divisions of political interests were manifested overtly and were even reinforced by the September and October, 1967, elections, particularly in elections for the National Assembly. No party could claim a majority in either house. Catholics were over-represented in the Senate as were Northerners and advocates of a hard line toward Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.). The Farmer-Labor-Soldier party of General Tran Van Don and Dang Van Sung, supported by the powerful Vietnamese Labor Confederation of Tran Quoc Buu, was the closest to a national slate, including not only military and civilian members but also sect and highlander members. Militant Buddhists were unrepresented as a group in the upper house because their slates were invalidated, leading to criticism of the Senate as an institution for advancing the

¹ Official statistics on these elections are provided in *Public Administration Bulletin Vietnam*, No. 38 (Saigon: AID, June 1, 1967) and in "The Presidential Election," *Vietnam Report* (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Vietnam, September, 1967). Analysis of the 1965 and 1966 elections is found in "South Vietnam: 'Struggle' Politics and the Bigger War," by John C. Donnell and Charles A. Joiner, *Asian Survey* (January, 1967), pp. 53-68.

² "The tradition of government by personality, together with the importance of face-saving, gives rise to many cases of conflict between groups." Nghiem Dang, *Vietnam: Politics and Public Administration* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 366.

old Can Lao political party of Ngo Dinh Nhu. At least one-fourth of the senators were former Can Lao members. The potentially significant All Vietnam party led by Nguyen Ngoc Linh failed to elect any of its three Senate slates.

In the House, for which there were 1,140 candidates, there developed a fairly true posture of the power matrix in South Vietnam. Regions elected legislators representative of the local dominant group. The urban areas displayed independence of the regime, electing militant Buddhists, a Trotskyite and known leaders. Buddhist members from the militant element had approximately the same number as the Catholics, perhaps a fair national sample of comparative strength. Southerners, including some supporters of Tran Van Huong and other civilian presidential candidates, together with sect members, gained a respectable percentage. General Don's party elected about as many as other interests, and the military and bureaucracy were amply represented. Although the age group averaged under 40, experienced politicians-administrators, including Constituent Assembly members, ex-province chiefs and provincial counsellors, were elected in respectable numbers.³ Thus, the national elections providing a "legitimate" representative body once again brought forward the traditional range of disparate interests. In all probability the least likely section of the constitution to be implemented remains Article 100, encouraging "progress toward a two-party system." The politics of religion, regional politics, ethnic politics and military vs. civilian politics have been perpetuated.

The Catholic revival was tied to a Diemist return to the political arena, despite Buddhist demands for a pogrom against Can Lao adherents, sometimes based on actual past grievances and sometimes based on specific political contingencies. Reprisals occurred at all levels, some severe and many only *pro forma*. But the numbers and the importance

of the personages drawn by Ngo Dinh Nhu into the Can Lao, in addition to the secrecy of many of its activities, meant that an honest, comprehensive attack on all members of the old political party would eliminate a high percentage of the Vietnamese elite. In the military, in the bureaucracy and in many important groups, the Can Lao members continued to exercise their duties in middle-level and top-level positions. Although many were not Catholic, a true pogrom would have been viewed, no doubt accurately, as an anti-Catholic gesture. Certainly many important military leaders removed in 1964 and 1965 were the victims of attempts to meet Buddhist requests for steps against Catholic influence.

By 1966, however, the government needed allies badly. The Buddhist unrest eventually led Premier Nguyen Cao Ky to try to gain support among Catholics. A number of important imprisoned persons were released, and large numbers gained their freedom as the government appealed directly to the Catholic hierarchy. Governmental appointments supplemented this appeal. In the Center region, Catholic groups had worked closely with factions of either the V.N.Q.D.D. (Vietnamese Nationalist party) or the Dai Viet (another major party) in opposition to Buddhist control. Small Catholic "armies" had given village protection and had given aid to "military" forces of the older parties. In the Center, an attempt had been made by Buddhist "struggle" groups to eliminate Catholic rivals. The isolation of these Catholics from the social-political fabric of the remainder of the nation increased, and Father Hoang Quynh's militant Catholic group's programs to bring refugees to Southern Catholic communities simultaneously reinforced the "bloc" nature of the groups and intensified their isolation.

In the 1967 Senate races, the "bloc" element was decisive. Unlike the divided Buddhists and sects, Catholic cohesion resulted in "delivered" votes favoring a Northern Catholic slate led by Nguyen Van Huyen, a Southern Catholic slate led by Nguyen Gia Hien of the Catholic Greater Union Force and slates of former Diemist officials. In the

³ *Washington Post*, October 24, 1967. Average age for the 117 members elected to the Constituent Assembly was 40, while the average was 49 for the members of the 984 elected village councils.

Senate race, where 48 slates (480 candidates) ran for six slots (60 senators), the ability of the Catholics as an electoral force in South Vietnam became apparent. Where numbers of candidates ran nation-wide, as in the presidential and Senate races, victory could go to tickets receiving a relatively small plurality. Because the Catholics could claim an organization perhaps second only to the government-military organization, they not only could provide blocs of votes but could be certain of high turnouts and of an electorate informed enough to make appropriate selections from among the numerous ballots (each voter received 59 ballots and selected 7). Such a manifestation of power assured the Catholic interest a significant voice through "A Social Democratic National Union" bloc in the Senate and also further alerted and reinforced perceptions of other interests (particularly militant Buddhists) to what they considered a serious political threat.

THE BUDDHISTS

Split internally from the inception of the Buddhist revitalization movement in the 1950's, though less divided than they had been historically, the Buddhists had a moment of unity and glory in 1963 in the anti-Ngo period—although important sects refused to join with the militant elements even then and important segments of their ranks split following Nhu's pagoda raids in August, 1963. From the fall of Diem until the struggle movement was forcefully squashed in the summer of 1966, the so-called United Buddhist Church (U.B.C.) presented a facade of unity. In reality, internal disputes weakened the Buddhist interest after 1963. Centrist elements under Thich Tri Quang, Northern elements under Thich Tam Chau, and Southern elements under Thich Thien Hoa could not form a single force. Tri Quang and Tam Chau differed on strategy and tactics; both disagreed with important Southern and lay elements surrounding Mai Tho Truyen who, early in the post-Diem period, had split formally with the U.B.C. Questions of personal power, of relationship with the South Vietnamese government (G.V.N.), of possible re-

lationships with the N.L.F., were never resolved.

Though publicly accepting the struggle movement's intention of toppling the Thieu-Ky government in 1966, Tam Chau approached this clash with no enthusiasm and provided very questionable cooperation. After its humiliating defeat by the government in 1966, the U.B.C. withdrew from the political arena, joined with Father Quynh in opposing participation in the Constituent Assembly elections, and proceeded to destroy the last vestiges of unity in a bitter internal factional fight. Recouping somewhat, Tam Chau received a charter from the government recognizing his own organization as the official Buddhist group in South Vietnam, obtained control of the Vien Hoa Dao, and even appointed his own senior patriarch. Tri Quang was forced to change tactics and publicly criticized Thieu as a Catholic aiding a man who had betrayed Buddhism.

Recognizing the fallacy of a tactic of non-involvement in the electoral processes he had initially demanded, the militant Buddhist leader, Tri Quang, presented slates for the Senate. The militant Buddhists found their slates disqualified and were not in a position to make those disqualifications the cause of a violent political struggle as they would have earlier. A number of presidential candidates, particularly Truong Dinh Dzu, did take issue during the campaign with Thieu because he recognized the Tam Chau group. And Tri Quang, recognizing that Duong Van Minh could not be a candidate, flirted with support of Tran Van Huong and finally supported Phan Khac Suu. A Minh candidacy, backed by Tri Quang, together with the general's over-all popularity and his Southern and military support, might possibly have won the election. The support for Suu did permit him to carry Hue, Danang, and Thua Thien Province and to cut deeply into the vote for Huong in a number of provinces. Tri Quang's post-election stance proved both his loss of significant numbers of followers and his continued ability to represent a political force that cannot be ignored. He could not greatly influence the legislative assembly in its rulings

on the validity of the election. Yet his open opposition at a time when the civilian candidates were claiming fraud and his siege, anticlimactic as it was, before Independence Palace did enhance his position vis-à-vis Tam Chau and persuaded the government to validate his adherents' candidacy for the House—an action that permitted the militant Buddhists to gain over a dozen seats in the 137-member lower body, including representatives from Hue, Danang and Saigon. However, the militant Buddhists continued to emphasize struggle against opposition interests through means other than the newly-formed political institutions.

THE SECTS

The political role of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects has increased greatly since the fall of Diem. Each succeeding government has attempted to gain support from the Western provinces by appeals to Cao Dai and Hoa Hao luminaries. An Giang and Chau Doc provinces have Hoa Hao civil leadership and vestiges of military leadership as well. In those sections where the sects are strong, given a free hand they are at least a match for the N.L.F. in terms of creating a political organization capable of engulfing entire populations. Unlike the N.L.F., however, the sects have never been able to exert discipline. The result, inevitably, has been divisions supporting either individual leaders or sub-sects. In addition, in the explosive and always potentially separatist region of Cochinchina, the sects' potential for insisting on autonomy in many functional areas, including the military sphere, has always been a source of fear in Saigon. But the central government has learned that the sects can be a most troublesome foe unless their minimum requirements are met. Diem made the fatal mistake of attempting to rule the sect areas and population by central regime appointees, disregarding their customs, religion and leadership. Even today there is no thorough documentation concerning each aspect of the

evolution of rebellion in South Vietnam, but one fact of the pre-N.L.F. (i.e., pre-1960) framework for insurrection was that it was primarily a Cochinchinese phenomenon and that the main early bodies of forces in insurrection were Cao Dai and Hoa Hao.⁴

In an attempt to consolidate the gains of post-Diem sect *ralliés* and to placate the sects (whose numbers probably are today a majority of the Cochinchinese population), important sect personages were included in governments and in national councils beginning with Duong Van Minh's 1963 regime. In the 1966 Constituent Assembly elections, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao provinces delivered the vote for their candidates as they did again a year later in the House elections. A solid bloc vote in the sect areas nearly brought to victory in sixth place a Cao Dai-Hoa Hao Senate slate led by Phan Ba Cam. The military ticket bargained hard among sect leaders and thereby ran well in the presidential race in sect areas. General Thieu, in fact, had planned to have Trinh Quoc Khanh, of the Hoa Hao Social Democratic party, as his vice-presidential running mate before a compromise ticket was worked out with Nguyen Cao Ky. The military ticket did not gain sect sympathy by the invalidation of the presidential ticket of Hoang Chu Ngoc, the "Secretary General of the Cao Dai Church," because his 76-year old running mate had not performed military service.⁵ Truong Dinh Dzù had built an organization in the west and received important Tan Dai Viet (even among segments of the military) and sect votes and perhaps N.L.F. votes as well, even carrying the Cao Dai Tay Ninh Province stronghold. Suu, Huong and Ha Thuc Ky also greatly split the presidential votes in the provinces dominated by the sects. Thus the sects viewed generally as an anachronism in the mid-1950's once again are playing an important role in Vietnamese politics. Like other interests, they cannot present a solid force against their opponents.

REGIONAL POLITICS

Although a vital political issue, the significance of each of the three regional interests

⁴ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), Ch. 4.

⁵ *Saigon Post*, July 27, 1967.

is often more apparent than real. Stereotypes for each region are universally known among the Vietnamese. Common educational and cultural backgrounds and experiences since the beginning of the Indochina War have to some extent reinforced a certain particularistic orientation among the elite from each region. Diem placed an Annamese and Tonkinese elite in positions where a great deal of political and economic power could be denied to the Cochinchinese. This situation was of considerable relevance during the initial period of insurgency. And the high percentage of Catholics among the Northern and Centrist groups hardly lessened the assumed discrimination.

Except for the government of Duong Van Minh, the non-Southern texture of the regimes has remained a subject of political controversy. The issue was dramatized in 1966 when Southern cabinet members threatened a mass resignation. Prior to this threat, the importance of the Southern group for governmental viability was made even more apparent by its support of the regime in its encounter with the basically Centrist Buddhist struggle movement. Though Premier Ky eventually responded with several ministerial slots as a *quid pro quo*, he did so only after the Southern forces threatened withdrawal of support and not as a token of gratitude for assisting him to remain in power.

With the arrangement made for a set of electoral steps during 1966–1967, the Southern forces began to plan for an enlargement of their political power. Southern separatist Tran Van Van's appointment as chairman of the People-Military Council was an important step. The Constituent Assembly pro-

vided a forum for Southern demands. Due to the varied interests which were more or less sympathetic to the Southern position—e.g., the sects, the Southern Buddhist Association, and a host of individual governmental, military, economic and student leaders—there was never any possibility for the creation of a significant Cochinchinese bloc. In the 1967 presidential election, the number of candidates (11 tickets), the competing civilian organizations in the South (particularly those of Dzu, Suu, Huong, Ha Thuc Ky), the solid Thieu-Ky organization and the ability of the military candidates' representatives to bargain for support of important Southern provincial leaders, and the role of the sects as a separate set of Southern forces, effectively neutralized the Cochinchinese as a national electoral force. The Southerners' position in the House, elected by districts at the province level, is numerically better than in the Senate. But their power position even in the House is dissipated.

Because of the nature of succeeding governments in South Vietnam and because of the evolution of forces involved in carrying out the insurgency, a number of important Cochinchinese have been proceeding toward implementation of a "Southern" political solution to the war. Tran Van Van's role in this remains obscure, but his assassination and that of Nguyen Ngoc An (a Cao Dai leader from Tay Ninh supporting Huong) led to speculation that extensive Southern elements have worked further toward attainment of this program than is openly recognized. Unquestionably, the N.L.F. leadership has had to contend with Southern chauvinism at least as much as the Saigon government; the People's Revolutionary party (P.R.P.) is a Tonkinese apparatus to provide discipline and increasing organizational control in the face of Southern tendencies toward autonomy.⁶ The 1967 N.L.F. platform explicitly opts for a "national union democratic government" comprised of Southern interests. Tran Hoai Nam, N.L.F. delegate in Algiers, explained the new program by stating "the question of South Vietnam must be solved by the South Vietnamese themselves."⁷

⁶ Charles A. Joiner, "Organization Theory of Revolutionary Warfare," *Vietnam Perspectives* (February, 1967), pp. 15–34.

⁷ *The New York Times*, September 15, 1967. Also: Denis Warner, "The NLF's New Program," *The Reporter* (October 5, 1967), pp. 23–30. A careful evaluation of possible steps toward a N.L.F.-G.V.N. rapprochement is presented by: Robert Shaplen in "Viet Nam: Crisis of Indecision," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1967), pp. 95–110; Ithiel de Sola Pool in "Political Alternatives to the Viet Cong," *Asian Survey* (August, 1967), pp. 555–566; and Josiah Lee Auspitz in "The Realities of Vietnam: An Alternative for Republicans" (a Ripon Forum research paper, September, 1967).

Presidential candidates, including Dzu, Huong and Suu, emphasizing the necessity for some steps toward peace, did not formally articulate the Southern solution. Because any plan for peace that involved only Hanoi could not provide a guarantee against the continuation of *maquis* Southern forces and of rival local governments, advocates of the Southern solution insist they can bring peace and eliminate unwanted Tonkinese interference in the affairs of Cochinchinese of every political persuasion. The difficulty, however, remains that the Southern solution would actually be a Cochinchinese solution and neither the Northerners nor the Centrists are prepared to abdicate their political elite positions above or below the 17th Parallel. The new regime is still dominated by non-Southerners and as such its legitimacy is unlikely to be accepted without question by the Southern forces. Appointment of a Southerner, Nguyen Van Loc, as prime minister did not alter this situation.

ETHNIC POLITICS

Ethnic politics has become increasingly significant. Special provisions were made for the Khmer population, for example, in the Constituent Assembly election and in local elections. In addition, recognizing their electoral potential, the military presidential ticket made campaign commitments concerning political and economic improvements for both the Khmers and the economically important Chinese group that has been discriminated against since the early part of the Diem period. However, the most potentially politically disruptive ethnic group remained the indigenous non-Vietnamese highlanders.

The tribal population of the Central Vietnamese Highlands had been formally excluded from national politics until the 1966 elections for the Constituent Assembly. Prior

to this point, the governments of Hue, Hanoi and Saigon had followed programs for handling a problem area rather than for accommodating the interests of the numerous tribal groups and communities. The exception had been the Viet Minh who had worked closely with and relied heavily upon the Tho and other important highland groups in Tonkin.⁸ Diem, in effect, had reversed a French policy of inclusion of *montagnards* in the government and administration of the highlands, excluding them from most forms of involvement in the politics of their own region.

Efforts to mobilize support in the highlands first by the Viet Minh, then by the N.L.F., and eventually by the United States Special Forces, brought highland politics into the national political picture even prior to the downfall of the Ngo family. Ever since 1963, the highlands have remained a bed of political unrest. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (D.R.V.N.) has reactivated Viet Minh *maquis* and has shifted the burden of the Vietnamese war from the Mekong Delta to the highland area and to the coastal areas having access to the highlands.

Caught in the middle in a Vietnamese affair, the tribesmen were forced to take sides.⁹ Those elements opting for an anti-N.L.F. stance did so only under understandings with the United States Special Forces. However, increasingly the tribesmen demanded a voice in political and administrative highland affairs in return for their cooperation. Although tentatively agreeing to the concept of attention to tribal interests, both directly and indirectly the Saigon government acted to prevent not only separatist activities but all actions geared toward tribal control of highland affairs. Inevitably, in view of the mobilization of forces and the conflicting counter-demands, political movements gained credence, demanding various degrees of autonomy.

The most important tribal political movement, the Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Peoples (FULRO), led by Y Bham, expedited its demands through organization to pressure both the Americans and Saigon. In 1964 and in 1965, FULRO directed abor-

⁸ A provocative analysis of the politics of the highlands during the First Indochina War is John T. McAlister's "Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh: A Key to the Indochina War," in *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations*, edited by Peter Kunstadter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 771-844.

⁹ Charles A. Joiner, "Administration and Political Warfare in the Highlands," *Vietnam Perspectives* (November, 1965), pp. 19-37.

tive revolts, relying primarily upon forces in Special Forces camps, withdrew allegiance and rallied again to the regime. G.V.N. promises proved less than exacting commitments. Y Bham, operating usually from Cambodia, reached agreements only to see them thwarted, on occasion by commitment of the South Vietnamese army (A.R.V.N.) against FULRO forces.

Although creating a Commissariat for Highland Affairs under Paul Nur, and taking a number of steps to appease highlander demands, the Ky government displayed little sympathy with the FULRO program. The warlord nature of II Corps command did little to improve the government's position. Nonetheless, in 1966, constructive action was finally taken toward involving tribal groups legally in national politics. Special provision was made for the election of tribal representatives to the Constituent Assembly. An increase in tribesmen at the National Institute of Administration, the establishment of boarding schools, special provisions for high school and college entrance, and participation in village council elections were evidence of increased regard for the tribal demands. Ky, in fact, made an extensive set of commitments during the presidential campaign. Representation in the House was assured, a Nung and a Djerai were elected to the Senate, a special Ethnic Council (two-thirds of its membership elected by the ethnic minorities) and civil rights were guaranteed by the new constitution, and a so-called bill of rights was proclaimed August 27. Corps II was safely delivered to the Thieu-Ky ticket on September 3.

With the initiation of a new structure of government for South Vietnam, tribal interests were provided with more legal protections and with more formal legal and political avenues of access to government policy-making for their representatives. Eventually, the tribesmen may also elect their own province chiefs as provided in the constitution, although province chiefs throughout South Vietnam are to be appointed by the President during his first four-year term. Responding to Ky's pledges, large numbers of FULRO

adherents have once again rallied and Y Bham himself promised to return once he was assured of the legitimacy of implementation of commitments and constitutional provisions. Nonetheless the tribal groups are far from a united force, despite the increasing importance of FULRO, and the N.L.F. will attempt to capitalize upon any G.V.N. failure to implement political commitments. The N.L.F. can still afford to promise what no Vietnamese government (either in Saigon or in Hanoi) would ever really carry through—the ultimate political solution of highland political autonomy which in the final analysis is the underlying dream of the tribal interests.

POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND PEACE

Although questions of religious strife, regionalism, ethnic suppression, political orientation, local versus central control, and personal ambition dominated the political arena of South Vietnam before and after the coup against Diem, numerous substantive issues were also increasingly debated as the Second Indochina War expanded after 1964. Among the most important issues during the election campaign, Constituent Assembly and other debates were corruption, inflation, urban blight (an increasingly serious problem) and abuses of individual and group civil liberties. But the overriding substantive issue was the question of possible negotiations, deescalation and peace. And increasingly the position of the United States in South Vietnam has been tied to the question of peace. An underlying

(Continued on page 50)

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Considering North Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China, this author concludes that "the North Vietnamese have zigzagged their way through the Sino-Soviet conflict. They have remained neutral or have taken sides when their national interest so dictated."

China and North Vietnam: The Limits of the Alliance

BY ISHWER C. OJHA

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NO MEANINGFUL discussion of the present state of Sino-Vietnamese relations is possible without first determining some basic objectives of North Vietnamese foreign policy. Since 1925,¹ Ho Chi Minh's principal aim has been the "liberation" of Vietnam under a revolutionary, Communist government. This aim was probably established in the mind of Ho Chi Minh even before the name of Mao Tse-tung was known. Forty years later, North Vietnam and President Ho are continuing the fight for the attainment of the same broad goals.

After struggling for decades in exile, Viet Minh leaders under Ho finally took the first step toward the realization of their aims during World War II, drawing on peasant nationalism to achieve national independence under Communist rule. During the same period, the movement was also supported by the Western allies, although at times this support was more oblique and verbal than concrete. The second and more important step came in 1954, when Ho moved to the conference table after eight years of very heavy sacrifices and fighting with the French. In

retrospect, it seems clear that the North Vietnamese leadership was not united about the achievement through the Geneva Conference of its basic objective. Le Duan (who, among all the North Vietnamese leaders, was most familiar with the South) knew that the Geneva settlement would not clear the path to incorporation of the South into the new Vietnam. Pham Van Dong, the chief delegate to the Geneva Conference of 1954, thought that the 1956 elections would probably never take place, but he hoped for the collapse of the artificial political machinery that was being created in the South.² Whatever the hopes and fears of the various North Vietnamese leaders, one thing was clear: they could not win in the conference room what they had come to believe was theirs.

A study of the negotiating techniques at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 further clarifies this point. During the 1954 conference on Indochina, Moscow pressured Hanoi to accept the 17th Parallel as a temporary demarcation line pending the elections; in 1962, faced with the joint opposition of the Chinese and North Vietnamese delegations, the Soviets had more difficulty coercing Hanoi into acceptance of the Laotian settlement. Yielding to what was probably the highpoint of effective Soviet pressure, in 1962 the Vietnamese leaders permitted the extension

¹ In 1925, Ho Chi Minh (then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc, literally "Nguyen who loves his country") organized Vietnamese refugees in south China into the Association of Revolutionary Youth.

² See P. J. Honey, "Hanoi and the Vietnam War," *Mizan*, January-February, 1967.

to Laos of the inspection jurisdiction of the International Control Commission (I.C.C.).

At neither of these conferences did the North Vietnamese enter into direct negotiations with the Western powers. Great Britain and the Soviet Union were cochairmen of both conferences. The Soviets met regularly with the North Vietnamese and Chinese delegations and then reported the results of these meetings to the British, who were performing the same function for the Western delegations. Most of the negotiations in 1954 and in 1962 took place in these parallel meetings. It is therefore difficult to assess the exact degree of pressure that the North Vietnamese underwent before they agreed to the terms which the Soviets wanted them to accept. Nevertheless, it is clear that by 1962 their faith in the conference method to achieve their goals and in the Soviet Union to look after their interests had sunk to new depths. In fact, evidence that Soviet pressure was applied to its maximum and to extremely unwilling allies (in this case China and North Vietnam) became clear three years later, when the I.C.C.'s authority in Laos could not be renewed.

Various interpretations of North Vietnam's relations with the Communist bloc are possible, but one factor is clear: in both 1954 and 1962, the so-called Communist alliance between the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam demanded heavy sacrifices from Hanoi. In 1954, China supported the Soviet pressure on North Vietnam; even at the

height of the Sino-Soviet dispute, China has never accused Soviet "revisionism" of selling out North Vietnamese interests in 1954. Yet China did side with the North Vietnamese in 1962, when the Soviets found out that a negotiated compromise had become a Herculean task.³ Soviet reluctance to convene a third Geneva Conference is probably due to the consequent realization that by 1962 the limits of Soviet influence had been exhausted.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: THE VIEW FROM HANOI

In line with these considerations, the North Vietnamese have zigzagged their way through the Sino-Soviet conflict. They have remained neutral or have taken sides when their national interest so dictated. Between 1960 and 1963, they held a neutral position, partly because they did not feel strongly about the ideological merits of either side. When they moved a little closer to the Chinese position in late 1963 and 1964, they did so primarily because of the demands of national interest. The results of the Laos Conference, India's shift on the International Control Commission after the Sino-Indian hostilities of 1962, and the growing Soviet-American rapprochement exemplified in the Test Ban Treaty of July, 1963, all dictated such a move.⁴

When the Vietnamese conflict entered a new phase in 1964 with the Gulf of Tonkin confrontation and its aftermath, North Vietnamese national interest demanded a return to neutrality. Even in the period preceding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, however, Hanoi had not taken an unqualified pro-Chinese stand. Accordingly, the visit of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin to Hanoi in January, 1965, represented a Soviet hope of regaining lost ground with Hanoi by taking advantage of the new levels of conflict in which the North Vietnamese knew they would soon be involved.

Yet Russian optimism regarding the Soviet Union's ability to score a new Geneva and thereby to preserve its own way of managing Soviet-American conflicts was soon proved wrong. The Russians found that the North Vietnamese did not and will not place any-

³ Observer, "Soviet Revisionist Ruling Clique Is Rank Traitor to Vietnamese Revolution," *Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily)*, April 30, 1967, in *Peking Review*, May 5, 1967. In this article, the Chinese attack Soviet revisionism for betraying Vietnamese national interests even when Nikita Khrushchev was in power. This is a direct attack on Khrushchev's role in 1962.

⁴ This point has been made in different forms by many scholars. See William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 66-76; John C. Donnell, "North Vietnam: A Qualified Pro-Chinese Position," in R. A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolutions in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); King Chen, "North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1962-1964," *Asian Survey*, September, 1964; and R. A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1963.

thing above their perception of their national interest. The most the Soviets could achieve was to keep North Vietnam neutral in the Sino-Soviet debate. By 1966, the Soviet Union found that it had no choice but to become "more and more an echo of the North Vietnamese position." Since the Bucharest statement of 1966, the Soviet Union has shown progressively less inclination to play a positive role in arranging a negotiated settlement and making the North Vietnamese play conference diplomacy again.⁵

Just as the North Vietnamese qualified their pro-Chinese position in 1963–1964 in the light of their national interest, so the neutrality of the 1965–1967 period was again dictated by a hard and realistic assessment of their own needs. The Russians supply the North Vietnamese with most of their defensive and some of their offensive capabilities; in spite of this supposed leverage, however, the pressure the Soviet Union could exert in 1954 and, to a lesser extent, in 1962, was negligible in 1966–1967. The dominant faction of the Hanoi leadership is probably con-

vinced that any new negotiated settlement will again defeat its basic objective. Similarly, Chinese support of North Vietnam in 1962 (as opposed to 1954) and again in the more recent period can and did imply that China also looks after her own national interest. In short, Soviet hegemony no longer holds sway over the national interests of either Peking or Hanoi.

THE STRATEGY OF PEOPLE'S WARS

Throughout the period of heavy American involvement in the Vietnamese conflict, the Chinese have expressed cautious conditional assistance. This policy of cheering from the sidelines has not been unnoticed by the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the Chinese have consistently maintained that they will become directly involved only if the United States attacks them, knowing that this is a remote possibility. There is enough evidence from the debate in China regarding American involvement in Vietnam to conclude that the Chinese will intervene only when their national interest, as they perceive it, so demands.⁶

Also included in this Chinese debate was disagreement about the strategy of conflict to be pursued by the North Vietnamese and the N.L.F. (National Liberation Front). On the one hand, the Chinese faction opposed to the literal application of the Maoist doctrine of people's wars agreed that the level of United States involvement seriously limited and even precluded the possibility of continuing the people's war strategy. Needing external assistance, Vietnam had to go on to another stage and level of strategy. It was emphasized that the N.L.F. had switched from guerrilla tactics to a regular force strategy of the "South Vietnamese Liberation Army." A change in strategy of this kind naturally implied heavy reliance on external assistance.⁷

On the other hand, the rigid application of the doctrine of people's war as expounded by Mao and reproduced during the period of heavy conflict continued to place emphasis on self-reliance and on the universality of the Chinese experience as developed by Mao.⁸

⁵ "Vietnam: The Soviet Dilemma," *Mizan*, September–October, 1966.

⁶ For a fuller treatment of this subject see the author's article on "China's Cautious American Policy," *Current History*, September, 1967.

⁷ Ch'ang Kung, "The Bankruptcy of the U.S. Special War in South Vietnam," *Shih-Chieh Chih-Shih* (*World Knowledge*), No. 12, June 25, 1965, in *Survey of China Mainland Magazines (SCMM)*, No. 481, July 26, 1965, pp. 1–4.

⁸ "The Great Victory of Leninism," *Hung-ch'i* editorial, No. 4, April 30, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 469, May 17, 1965; Shih Tung-hsiang, "The Deciding Factor of Victory or Defeat in War Is Man, not Matter," *Hung-ch'i*, No. 7, June 14, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 477, July 6, 1965; Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *Peking Review*, No. 36, September 3, 1965; Tung Ming, "The People's Revolutionary Strategy Will Surely Triumph Over U.S. Imperialism's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy,"—In Commemoration of the first anniversary of the publication of Comrade Lin Piao's essay "Long Live the People's War!," *Peking Review*, No. 37, September 9, 1966; and Tung Ming, "The Invincible Weapon That Guarantees Victory in People's Revolutionary Wars," *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 1, 1967. Lin Piao's article on people's war, originally published on September 3, 1965, was republished again in *Peking Review*, No. 32, August 4, 1965. The articles by Tung Ming stressed the universal application of the Maoist concept of people's war and emphasized that the Maoist doctrine has been tested not only in China but also in other places, presumably Vietnam.

That this policy was neither possible nor practical had already been demonstrated in the actual shifts which had taken place in North Vietnamese and N.L.F. tactics. In fact, Soviet assistance had already recognized the need for a different kind of strategy if North Vietnam were to survive under heavy odds.

Hanoi and the N.L.F. are not happy about China's continuous emphasis on self-reliance and guerrilla warfare. They face a major defeat and can avert it only by following a different strategy which takes into account the continuously expanding American military commitment. That the Chinese, continuing to harp on the possibility of ultimate victory with protracted war and self-reliance, have not taken this need into account is very much evident from the Chinese press.⁹ The Vietnamese have been told that victory will come if they persist in a "revolutionary line" and a "protracted war" of the Maoist type.

As the war in the South escalated to new levels in 1966, several North Vietnamese statements and articles questioned the applicability of the Maoist doctrine of protracted warfare to the present condition of the Viet-

namese conflict. By the middle of 1966, this attitude had led to a partial deterioration of relations between China and Vietnam. Le Duan, who had built up near-perfect politicization of the South Vietnamese guerrilla bases, also found himself being slowly disavowed, as North Vietnam and the N.L.F. shifted their strategy from guerrilla to semi-regular warfare.

In September, 1966, while the Chinese press was celebrating the first anniversary of Lin Piao's article, *Hoc Tap*, the theoretical journal of the North Vietnamese, came out with a critical disavowal of the same. This article emphasized that the North Vietnamese should lose their inferiority complex and avoid too much reliance on foreign, obviously Chinese, experience. Similarly, in the last quarter of 1966, Premier Pham Van Dong and General Vo Nguyen Giap became more and more critical of Le Duan's position and therefore indirectly of the Chinese position regarding war strategy.¹⁰

REJECTION OF MAOIST STRATEGY

North Vietnamese sources also hinted that the Chinese strategy would have led to disastrous consequences. Thus the Lao Dong party which, together with the Japanese and the Brazilian Communist parties, had been the first to accept the validity of Chinese revolutionary experience on a universal basis in 1951, came around full circle in 1966 and, to a significant degree, rejected it. Significantly, this shift also showed that the North Vietnamese and the N.L.F. were aware of the basic differences between fighting the French and fighting the Americans,¹¹ a conclusion strengthened by the report of the Japanese Communist party delegation which visited Hanoi in February, 1966. The Japanese delegation emphasized that what the North Vietnamese and the N.L.F. need in the present situation is not self-reliance but a united front and united support from all Communist countries.¹²

For its part, Peking also chafes at many Vietnamese positions on the war. The Chinese press has sometimes omitted important announcements from Hanoi: for instance,

⁹ See Editorial, "Great Vietnamese War Against U.S. Aggression Will Be Crowned with Victory," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, July 21, 1967, in *Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP)*, No. 3987, July 25, 1967. The editorial emphasized the application of the doctrine of people's war and showed considerable optimism regarding ultimate Vietnamese victory. The Chinese insistence that the Vietnamese continue to use the Chinese strategy is further evident from Lin Piao's letter of greeting to Chairman Tran Van Trung, the military commissioner of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, dated February 14, 1967, on the occasion of South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces Day, *Peking Review*, No. 8, February 17, 1967.

¹⁰ P. J. Honey, "Hanoi and the Vietnam War," *Mizan*, January-February, 1967; W. A. C. Adie, "China and Vietnam War," *Mizan*, November-December, 1966; and Daniel Tretiak, "Challenge and Control," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 27, 1966, p. 216. For further criticism of the mechanical application of the doctrine of people's war, see *Hoc Tap* of July, 1966.

¹¹ *Nhan Dan* (official newspaper), June 14, 1966; and Hanoi Radio Broadcast, July 4, 1966.

¹² The statement may reflect the pro-Soviet and growing anti-Chinese sentiment of the Japanese Communist party, but nevertheless it is significant in the light of the Hanoi visit. Such differences in viewpoint are not confined only to China and North Vietnam. Even Hanoi and the N.L.F., united in their rejection of mechanical Maoism, differ at least in degree.

China was the only Communist country not to publish the interview given by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, emphasizing that negotiations must await an unconditional halt in the bombing of North Vietnam as well as American acceptance of the Four-Point proposal. This viewpoint was reasserted by the North Vietnamese diplomatic representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo.¹³ This Chinese omission has been interpreted by many analysts as evidence of China's reluctance to see a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. It could also mean, however, that China wants to continue the conflict at a level which ties down the United States and permits Peking to fight American "imperialism" *in absentia*. Following this line of thought, some observers have suggested that Peking has obstructed Soviet supplies to Vietnam because China does not want to raise the level of conflict to a level which would make it necessary to intervene.

The same analysis could be applied to the Maoist exhortation to the Vietnamese to fight at guerrilla levels and not to counter American escalation symmetrically. If this view is accurate—and there are some indications to support it—then China's national interest demands that Vietnam should continue to fight at a level which will continue to allow China to pursue a policy of indirect confrontation with a minimum risk of direct involvement. Obviously this is not in Hanoi's

national interest; instead North Vietnam prefers to follow counter-escalatory moves in strategy to avoid the total disaster which the Chinese revolutionary pattern would have entailed after the massive American commitment.

Such considerations *per se* do not necessarily make North Vietnam pro- or anti-Chinese. In fact, Hanoi followed Chinese strategy in the South until 1964, during a period when it was mostly neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the past and today, Hanoi follows an independent course, not only in the ideological maze of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but also in the complex of national interest, strategy, and the basic objectives of its foreign policy.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The major portion of the period of heavy conflict in Vietnam has coincided with the Cultural Revolution in China in its most virulent and extensive form. At no time during this entire period have the North Vietnamese supported the Cultural Revolution in either their messages or their statements.¹⁴ In a letter of greetings to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong party avoided any mention of either the Cultural Revolution or Soviet revisionism.¹⁵ This divergence becomes obvious whenever Chinese, North Vietnamese, and N.L.F. delegates speak from the same platform. Thus, at a Peking rally to celebrate the 17th Anniversary of the "Vietnam Day Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism," Chinese delegates like Kuo Mo-jo exalted the Cultural Revolution and condemned Soviet revisionism, while the North Vietnamese delegate, Le Chung Thuy, chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Vietnamese embassy in Peking, concentrated his attacks on United States imperialism. The same attitude was reflected in the speech of Nguyen Minh Phuong, acting head of the Permanent Mission to China of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation¹⁶

The Chinese, obviously unhappy about this state of things, are eager for any Vietnamese to express admiration for the Cultural Revolution.

¹³ The English translation of this interview was released by Vietnam News Agency (V.N.A.), January 28, 1967, through Radio Hanoi.

¹⁴ See Adie, *op. cit.*; and New China News Agency (NCNA), English release, August 1, 1967. General Giap's cable on the anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army emphasized the P.L.A.'s role in the development of nuclear weapons but made no mention of the Cultural Revolution. Similar silence was maintained by General Giap in his speech in Hanoi on the occasion celebrating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese P.L.A. That General Giap's attitude is not shared by the Laotian People's Liberation Army's Supreme Commander, Khamtay Siphandone, is evident from his message on the same anniversary released by the NCNA on August 2, 1967.

¹⁵ V.N.A., June 30, 1967.
¹⁶ "Firm Support for the Vietnamese People to Completely Defeat U.S. Imperialism," *Peking Review*, No. 13, March 24, 1967.

lution. On March 24, 1967, for example, *Jen Min Jih Pao* published an article by Nguyen Bui, entitled "The Greatest Revolutionary Movement in History." Unable to find an important official who would subscribe to such views, the Chinese identified the writer as a "Vietnamese friend."¹⁷

Similarly, a study of messages on China's successful explosion of a hydrogen bomb pinpoints the limits of the Sino-Vietnamese *entente*. While the North Vietnamese congratulated the Chinese on having increased their national defense capabilities and their ability to support wars of national liberation, the Albanians credited this achievement to the thought of Chairman Mao. Although North Vietnam's national interest may demand that she remain on the good side of China, Hanoi's leaders are not prepared to follow the Albanian example and risk their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and thereby their flexibility and independence of action.¹⁸

POLICY OF NEUTRALITY

Neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, so crucial to Hanoi's prosecution of the war, has led to its refusal either to decry Soviet "revisionism" or to support Soviet charges that China is obstructing war supplies to Vietnam. The North Vietnamese have taken pains to emphasize that they enjoy support

from all Socialist countries.¹⁹ The only exception they have made in the entire Socialist bloc is Yugoslavia.²⁰ It is impossible for them to concur with the Soviet charges of Chinese obstruction or to follow China in her anti-Soviet policies.²¹

The international Communist movement has undergone radical changes in the last decade. Polycentricism has become characteristic of both European and Asian communism. National communism is older than the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the retrospective and rather belated recognition of communism's inability to conquer the ideology of nationalism adds clarity and sophistication to the study of the foreign and domestic policies of Communist countries.

The North Vietnamese consider the unity of Vietnam under their aegis as a primary goal. Neither Soviet nor American pressure can bring them to a negotiating table, because they believe that in negotiation they would lose again. Nor have they bowed to Chinese pressure to follow the low-risk confrontation policy of self-reliance and asymmetrical response; given the extent of American involvement, such a strategy would fail and might even destroy their goal.

In Vietnam, Soviet and Chinese interests coincide in some ways and diverge in others. The Soviets want a negotiated solution because Southeast Asia is not vitally important to them. The Chinese encourage a protracted war at a low level to tie down the United States and to hamper a Soviet-American rapprochement. The dominant sector of the Vietnamese leadership wants to fight until the Americans will negotiate to enable North Vietnam to achieve her basic goal: unification under Hanoi's aegis.

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¹⁷ See *Peking Review*, No. 15, April 7, 1967.

¹⁸ "Congratulations on China's First H-Bomb Explosion," *Peking Review*, June 23, 1967.

¹⁹ V.N.A., January 26, 1967 quoting *Nhan Dan*, January 26, 1967. Here Vietnam does not differentiate between Soviet and Chinese support. See also NCNA releases for February 1, 1967 and March 1, 1967.

²⁰ See *New York Times*, October 29, 1967, p. 27. It is significant that Ho Chi Minh placed Soviet Union first, China second, and the rest of the Communist revolution in the third category as far as the importance of their revolutionary experience is concerned. Only Yugoslavia is not mentioned by Ho. Also, the difference between Sino-Albanian and Sino-Vietnamese relations can be seen from the fact that China and Albania rejected the invitation to go to Moscow for the 50th Anniversary celebrations while Vietnam and Korea did go.

²¹ "Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement on New Developments in the Vietnamese Situation," March 5, 1967, *Peking Review*, March 10, 1967; Observer, "Smash the Big U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, February 20, 1967, *Peking Review*, No. 9, February 24, 1967.

BOOK REVIEWS

READINGS ON ASIA

STUDIES ON ASIA, 1966. EDITED BY ROBERT K. SAKAI. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967, 185 pages, notes, and tables \$5.25.)

This volume summarizes the research and observations of a dozen political scientists, historians, linguists and sociologists who have taken a professional interest in the Asian scene. Thus the monograph benefits from a variety of descriptive and interpretive statements by specialists about specific social and economic problems. Four essays deal with matters relevant to the evolution of India, four focus sharply on Japanese issues and the remaining items discuss geographically-oriented questions peculiar to Malaysia, Thailand, North Korea and China.

If there is any single conclusion that emerges from the labor of the many specialists, it is that there are many fruitful ways to approach the complexities of Asian society. Certainly the preliminary observations of the authors on such diverse topics as: Buddhism in Japan, India, and Ceylon, the nature of political socialization of the Thai-Islam in South Thailand, the arresting history of American gunboats on the Yangtze, and finally, the control, concentration and managerial functions of North Korean industry attest to the intellectual commitment of American scholars to the men, ideas and institutions of Asia.

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SOUTH-EAST ASIA—RACE, CULTURE, AND NATION. BY GUY HUNTER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. 190 pages and index, \$4.50.)

A basic primer on the modern and traditional structures of Southeast Asia, this modest work of less than 200 pages discusses

the interwoven patterns of life in one of the Asian regions. The emphasis in this tract is placed on the role of minorities within the nations, the search by national leaders for a balance between religious and secular values, an evaluation of factors that make for economic growth in the transitional state, the conflict of classes within many of the prevailing communities, and the quest for national identity among Southeast Asia's many ethnic groups.

The result of considerable research, this book can be highly recommended as a broad introduction to the problems of heterogeneous societies. R.P.

JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR: RECORDS OF THE 1941 POLICY CONFERENCES. TRANSLATED and EDITED BY NOBUTAKA IKE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 306 pages, appendices and index, \$8.50.)

As a primary source on Japanese military attitudes toward the United States, Italy and Germany, this book presents a full-scale record of available documents and notes on a series of conferences held by various Japanese ministers of state on the eve of World War II. The ministers evaluate the strength of their allies and adversaries—immediate and potential—and in the process disclose much of the tension underpinning Japanese society in the 1930's. The basic value system of the cabinet is revealed in the many policy briefs which the war minister, the finance minister and the minister of foreign affairs present on behalf of their respective interests and unseen constituents. In a sense, a vital decision-making process is unravelled without the exclusive benefit of editorial hindsight. As such, the account of Japan's thrust into Southeast Asia to acquire vital natural resources, and into the outer reaches of the

Pacific to neutralize American retaliatory power, is of unequalled scholarly importance. As a statement of personal ambitions, frustrated and realized, *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* is rich in detailed observations.

The entire collection of materials has been meticulously translated and edited by Nobutake Ike. He has brought to the sub-

ject much detailed research and information. In addition to presenting various records of the 1941 Imperial Policy Conferences, the editor has incorporated into the text a series of documents and explanatory notes which illuminate the substance of the discussions at the various staff meetings. In sum, this is a carefully documented his-

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

On August 2 and August 4, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked United States ships in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam. At the request of President Lyndon Johnson, Congress passed a joint resolution on August 7 authorizing him to act to repel armed attack and to prevent further aggression.¹ The Administration maintains that this resolution authorizes the war in Vietnam. The complete text of August 7, 1964, follows:

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in

Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

¹ H. J. Res. 1145, adopted on Aug. 7 unanimously by the House of Representatives and by the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2.

POLITICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Continued from page 41)

belief that the war had become an American matter that the Vietnamese could somehow resolve if left to themselves was inescapable. Even beyond this sentiment was an almost universal Vietnamese correlation of the United States presence with the other topics of debate such as inflation, corruption and retention of power by the military. Perennial presidential candidate Nguyen Dinh Quat's cynical references to the American big spenders and their influence upon official and public morals, echoed by many other politicians, were indicative of widespread feeling.

In short, the United States role has become the major political issue in South Vietnam. Adamant outcries against intervention in internal sovereignty on Buddhist placards in 1966 spelled out criticisms previously held by many but not voiced publicly. Individual politicians have continually spoken out against American support for the government in power. And during the presidential campaign, several candidates spoke to the issue of American intervention. Others, Huong for example, were explicit in stating that future negotiations should be conducted by the Vietnamese, with the United States excluded. Most of the pro-peace campaign statements, in fact, were at least mildly, even if subtly, anti-American. Since 1963, even leading government officials have expressed open resentment when embassy figures attempted to pressure for decisions. The most dramatic and blatant argument was that between Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General Nguyen Khanh during a 1965 period of ministerial musical chairs, but numerous incidents have occasioned resentment within the military directorate, when American pressure appeared to the Vietnamese to be unwarranted, unwanted and even insulting inter-

vention in matters they considered solely within their own prerogative. In a post-presidential election statement outlining the need for expanding the Vietnamese armed forces even Nguyen Cao Ky noted:

If we continue to let our foreign friends increase their troops and aid us we will lose our sovereignty and our country will become a colony. Sooner or later, our people would only be mercenaries serving a foreign power.¹⁰

Unless domestic political pressures coincide with American demands, chances of Vietnamese acquiescence are minimal. Since the fall of Diem, the principal United States pressures have been toward persuading the military to establish a "legitimized" national government founded on a constitutional basis and directed by a representative group of leaders. The elections of 1966-1967 provided a framework for obtaining this primary objective, but Saigon agreed to this electoral process more because of the demands of important group interests within South Vietnam than because it passively accepted American proposals.

The United States pushed for free elections in 1966 and for a Constituent Assembly that would operate relatively free of government intervention. Both objectives were more or less achieved. Despite certain irregularities, the 1966 elections were relatively free and the importance of the elected assembly was recognized by the directorate.¹¹ There was frequent pressure on the assembly, particularly by Premier Ky and Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, but the constitution-writing body was able to obtain concessions. The Constituent Assembly was even able to remain as a legislative assembly until the new government took office at the end of October, 1967, despite opposition from the military directorate. High priority items of the directorate were included in the constitution as compromises and not by fiat.

1967 ELECTIONS

The 1967 national elections were the steps most wanted by the Americans. In fact, Washington desperately wanted this vital process of legitimizing to appear free and

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, October 27, 1967.

¹¹ Bernard B. Fall provided a much different view in an indictment of the 1966 election. "Vietnam: The Quest for Stability," *Current History* (January, 1967), pp. 10-12.

open. Pressures by the American embassy on Ky to stop his preelection campaigning and on the directorate not to split over the campaign were considerable. Here American influence was appreciated. Thieu proved himself adequate enough as a politician to retain his own support and to capitalize on Ky's numerous political miscalculations. Directorate compromise achieved more than the embassy could have hoped for in terms of an expression of military unity when Ky acquiesced to second place on a national ticket with Thieu, although the rivalry between the two generals was hardly lessened by the compromise.

During the presidential election, the United States continued its pressure for an open and free referendum.¹² By sending important American "observers" to South Vietnam, Washington unquestionably allayed American criticism of the electoral process. This step was much resented by the civilian candidates who openly called it an attempt to whitewash irregularities they insisted existed and an additional manifestation of interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam. Following the election, when defeated civilian candidates seriously questioned the validity of the vote, the United States again faced the possibility that a legitimate government would not take office. In addition, the embassy failed to persuade the regime to follow to the letter the due procedural guarantees of the constitution when candidates Au Truong Thanh and Truong Dinh Dzu were "detained" without formality. This hardly provided evidence of legitimacy.

The embassy was successful, however, in its "lobbying" for Assembly ratification of the September 3 election, although it is unlikely that the final vote of 58-43 would have been significantly different without such lobbying.

In the broadest sense, American influence

on South Vietnamese political processes has been considerable. The elections were not staged for American policy-makers, as the cynics have claimed. Nor did the Assembly ratify Thieu's victory simply to avoid embarrassing the United States; political processes governed by power realities within South Vietnam determined this issue. The power of the military and the government combined with the support of important South Vietnamese interests were more than a match for the divided defeated presidential candidates.

In fact, the only opposition alliance that might have caused serious difficulty for the regime was clearly too little and too late. Truong Dinh Dzu, the "peace" candidate of the Ton Dai Viet party, who ran second in the presidential voting (receiving pluralities not only in Tay Ninh Province but also in Quang Ngai, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and Kien Phong provinces) and Vu Hong Khanh, the old nationalist revolutionary of the V.N.Q.D.D., offered a facade of unity with military Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang, but this attempt to broaden the base of opposition was only a surface front.

"BLOC" POLITICS

The elections and the composition of the new regime have intensified dissatisfaction. Potential for criticism of American influence in internal politics has been increased as a result of this bitterness and as a result of the relatively greater freedom of expression granted in the constitution. Ironically, and most important, the seeds for diminishing American political influence are planted in the legislative and executive structures formed to provide legitimacy for the Republic of Vietnam.

The government of South Vietnam has increased its bargaining power. Many interests may accept the actual legitimacy of the regime,¹³ given at least partial implementation of announced reforms, including crackdowns on corruption, decentralization of the military and Revolutionary Development apparatus, greater rights for ethnic minorities, reorganization of the civil service system, and extended authority to local councils.

¹² David Wurfel presents an absolute indictment of the entire 1967 electoral proceedings in a "Preliminary Report" issued by the Methodist Division of Peace and World Order (Washington, D.C.), September 21, 1967.

¹³ Charles A. Joiner, "The Ubiquity of the Administrative Role in Counterinsurgency," *Asian Survey* (August, 1967), pp. 540-554.

Both the old political parties and their numerous factions and the frequently established new parties are stumbling blocks for any administration.¹⁴ They represent important, disparate interests. Their constituencies may indeed be incompatible. Often the varied parties and groups cannot truly claim to represent their presumed constituencies. When legislative and ministerial politics is "bloc" politics, coalitions are formed due to personal contingencies rather than objective goals of interests.

The role of various third parties in such a complex political maze—in this instance the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the N.L.F.—readily becomes confused because this is only another interest whose objectives partly coincide at least temporarily with those of a shifting alignment of other interests. In many ways, the N.L.F. is in the strongest position of the third parties. It has closer contacts with a greater number of South Vietnamese interests than either Hanoi or Washington. But careful analysis may yet prove that the N.L.F. is not too dissimilar from the other important interest groups. It cannot escape operating in a political milieu characterized by fractionated interests any more than any party or government in South Vietnam.

¹⁴ Charles A. Joiner, "Patterns of Political Party Behavior in South Vietnam," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* (March, 1967), pp. 83–98.

U.S. ECONOMIC COMMITMENT

(Continued from page 14)

mary utility to the United States will probably be in obtaining wider burden-sharing for economic assistance in Asia and greater coordination in the planning and policies of the various bilateral aid programs.

After it has had a period of experience, the bank may well be able to evaluate and analyze requests for economic assistance from its member countries, appraise the effectiveness of their use of aid resources, the soundness of their economic plans and their policies, and

their development performance in general.

The development of regional institutions may also help resolve the dilemma of the American posture in Southeast Asia. The United States accepted overwhelming responsibility during the postwar decade when both the countries of the region and their former colonial sovereigns were struggling to emerge from disruption and destruction. Now that Europe and Japan are able to assist in the development of the area, regionalism may permit the United States to find a new relationship in which it no longer provides so large a share of the requisite economic aid. But the needs of the region, especially for investment loans on concessional terms, are so great that there is little chance that the United States will be able to reduce its present level of economic assistance. It can only hope that other nations will supply a substantial part of the additional requirements.

THE HARD TRUTHS

Americans are an impatient people. We have become accustomed to immediate results; if obstacles are not overcome we assume that the failure is due to inadequate effort or insufficient application of resources. We are only beginning to understand some of the hard truths of the development process, particularly in countries whose political and social systems are so different from our own.

As long as the containment of China is a prime motivator of United States policy in Southeast Asia, much American economic aid will be used to help countries of this area to meet security-related costs that have low priority for development. Real economic growth will come about only during a period of peace and as part of a process of modernization requiring political and social change, together with a sustained level of external aid. The road ahead will be long and difficult. The prospects for success depend, above all, on the maintenance of the moral commitment of the United States to provide, over a long period of time, its share of the resources necessary to help the Southeast Asian countries reduce the economic gap which separates them from the more fortunate parts of the world.

STAKES IN VIETNAM

(Continued from page 28)

eters, together with enveloping security zones for rural and urban development, would permit Vietnamese and allied civilian and military forces to shift from a kill ratio to a conversion quota, from military prosecution to political performance. Only a vigorous, honest and just program of reform with security will rally and solidify the Vietnamese on both sides of the political watershed. The attraction and protection of rural and urban centers of population in South Vietnam in a promising nationalist cause deserves the continued full weight of American efforts, but requires much greater attention and skill than the United States has so far shown.

Priority should go to political performance even though the politics of the war in Vietnam will require attention for several years—and in an extended time frame. Vietnamese society, politics and livelihood are abruptly shifting from a rural to an urban way of life as a result of military circumstances and political struggles. The United States effort, therefore, should now be realigned to take this shift into account. With time to accomplish military stabilization and political reform, and some economic prosperity—all of which are just beginning—there could be some form of coexistence and compromise between the two Vietnams in a common settlement looking toward the eventual unification of Vietnam. The success of the Vietnamese in the South could win the respect or at least the pragmatic acceptance of the authorities in Hanoi. A new parity could lead either to a truce and the silencing of violence or even to a union of interests and agreements.

However difficult it may seem to shift from a Northern strategy to a Southern strategy such as this, our high stakes and favorable prospects convince me the time is ripe for it. The United States and its allies have “unlost” the military war. Conventional combat and guerrilla warfare can be contained and reduced south of the 17th Parallel. The

United States has bought time so that the Vietnamese as well as all Southeast Asia can build national and regional institutions. Political vitality is emerging in South Vietnam. Although the South Vietnamese have hardly yet achieved adequate political viability of leadership and cohesion, they are on their way to solidifying enough firm ground to generate a Vietnamese capacity to make good their choice, to put their house in order, and stake out a watershed of coexistence and peaceful convergence with the North.

Only a strong stand, valid reform and solid nationalism in South Vietnam will induce the Hanoi authorities to accept peace and even consider negotiations. Perhaps the most valuable stake of all in this increasingly favorable outlook is the way other Asian governments have used the time and opportunity created by the American stand in Vietnam to put their various houses in order and surround Vietnam with a growing Southeast Asian sense of purpose, direction, cohesion and strength. American mistakes in Vietnam may be corrected. But stakes such as these, if lost, can never be reclaimed.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 49)

torical and political investigation of a deliberate policy for empire and aggrandizement. R.P.

THE INDUS RIVERS. BY ALOYS A. MICHEL. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. 595 pages and index, \$12.50.)

A labor of love, this exhaustive study consists of an analysis in unusual depth of a few riparian regional projects of economic importance wherever the Indus flows in West Pakistan and India. Michel's authoritative account of the beginnings of the Indus Basin scheme does not ignore the political implications for India and Pakistan in their quest for successful implementation of their long-range development plans. All major future work on this subject will have to refer to this volume. R.P.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of November, 1967, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Nov. 27—Arab League officials in Cairo announce that Arab chiefs of state will meet in early December.

Cyprus Dispute

Nov. 12—Greek armed forces are placed in a state of alert as Turkish air force jets continue flights over Greek territory for the 3d day.

Nov. 15—The Cyprus government orders a cease-fire after 8 hours of fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriotes in 2 villages. According to informed sources, the fighting began in the town of Ayios Theodoros after Greek Cypriote police and national guards tried to resume patrolling the Turkish sector; Turkish Cypriotes fired on the patrols, thereby evoking a "massive Greek Cypriote attack." The fighting then spread to the Turkish Cypriote village of Kophi-nou.

Nov. 16—Greek Cypriote troops agree to withdraw from the villages. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Greece ordered the withdrawal.

Turkish cabinet and military leaders pledge military intervention under Turkey's treaty right to intervene, if the sporadic fighting in Cyprus continues.

Nov. 17—According to *The New York Times*, the Turkish "Parliament [today] granted the Government authorization to 'send troops abroad' in a situation that might arise from Turkish intervention" in Cyprus.

Nov. 18—Following a Turkish government note delivered late November 17 to the Greek ambassador in Ankara, the Greek government recalls General George Grivas, the Greek-appointed defense chief of Cyprus.

Nov. 21—Newly-appointed Greek Foreign Minister Panayotis Pipinelis meets with Turkish Ambassador Turan Tuluy.

Nov. 22—Turkish reconnaissance flights over Cyprus continue for the 3d day.

Nov. 24—Greece and Turkey agree to accept NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio as mediator.

Nov. 25—Reliable sources report that the Greek government yesterday agreed to acquiesce to the Turkish demand for troop removal if the appeal were made by U.N. Secretary General U Thant and if the Turks would withdraw their invasion threat.

Nov. 27—Cyprus President Makarios is said to support the removal of all Greek and Turkish national forces from Cyprus with the aim of eventual demilitarization.

Nov. 30—In Athens, diplomatic sources report that Greece and Turkey have reached agreement to avoid war over Cyprus. The agreement is to be made public in the form of an appeal from U Thant, after procedural details are settled.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *Intl. Monetary Crisis*)

Nov. 19—The 6 finance ministers of the E.E.C. agree to contribute to the \$1.4-billion loan that Britain is seeking from the International Monetary Fund. (See also *United Kingdom*.)

Nov. 20—The 6 foreign ministers of the E.E.C. meet in Brussels; further discussion of British admission and British devaluation of the pound is postponed until December 18-19.

Nov. 27—In his semiannual news conference, French President Charles de Gaulle says Britain and the Common Market are in-

compatible until Britain can "transform" herself.

In the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson reaffirms Britain's decision to seek E.E.C. membership.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Nov. 24—The 74 members of GATT unanimously elect the Swiss ambassador to London, Olivier Long, to serve as director general, succeeding Eric Wyndham White.

International Monetary Crisis

(See also *United Kingdom* and *U.S., Economy*)

Nov. 18—Britain devalues the pound.

Nov. 21—It is reported that France has refused for the past 5 months to continue contributing to the International Gold Pool, committed to maintaining the price of gold at \$35 an ounce. French sources disclose that France will formally withdraw from the Gold Pool, run by the central banks of France and 7 other nations.

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler confirms that France no longer participates in the Gold Pool.

Nov. 24—Iceland becomes the 22d nation to devalue its currency after Britain.

In London, where 80 per cent of total world trading in gold takes place, gold dealers report that gold purchases reached a record volume today.

Nov. 26—The governors of the remaining 7 central banks—the U.S., Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy and Switzerland—forming the International Gold Pool meet secretly in Frankfurt, Germany. A communiqué issued in Washington by Fowler and Federal Reserve Board Chairman William Martin, Jr., asserts that the 7 central banks have enough foreign exchange reserves and gold to maintain the price of gold at \$35 an ounce. The 7 central banks together hold over \$27 billion worth of gold. It is reported that during the present heavy wave of gold purchases—the largest since the market reopened at the

end of World War II—the total volume has been under \$500 million.

Middle East Crisis

Nov. 1—It is reported by diplomatic sources in Washington that U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson has sent unofficial envoy Robert B. Anderson (who was Secretary of the Treasury under President Dwight D. Eisenhower) to the United Arab Republic to sound out U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser on opening talks with Israel, possibly through a U.N. representative. The U.S. State Department has declared that Anderson is in the U.A.R. on private business.

Nov. 2—It is reported in Washington that last night Anderson met with Nasser for 90 minutes.

Nov. 3—After 20 days of consideration, the 10 nonpermanent members of the 15-member U.N. Security Council declare that they have been unable to agree on a draft resolution authorizing a U.N. representative to be sent to the Middle East.

Nov. 5—On a U.S. television program, King Hussein of Jordan publicly admits that he is ready to recognize Israel's right to exist.

Nov. 6—In Washington, D.C., after conferences with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other U.S. officials, Hussein declares that his position is "very close" to Nasser's; in fact, "there is no difference." The 3 points he outlines for a settlement are: recognition of Israel's right to exist; an end to the state of war prevailing since 1948; and free maritime passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

Nov. 7—The U.A.R. asks for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss Israel's refusal to withdraw from territories conquered in the June, 1967, 6-day war. A 3-nation Indian-Mali-Nigerian draft resolution is submitted to the Security Council; it calls for Israeli withdrawal from conquered lands.

Nov. 8—A U.A.R. spokesman, Mohammed H. el-Zayyat, declares that the U.A.R. does guarantee Israel's right to exist; such a

guarantee is embodied in the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian armistice.

Nov. 21—Hussein confers in London with British Foreign Secretary George Brown.

Israeli jet planes attack Jordanian tanks on the east bank of the Jordan River after the tanks fired on observation posts on the Israeli-controlled West Bank.

Nov. 22—The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts a British resolution for restoring peace to the Middle East. The resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli troops from all conquered territory, acknowledges the right of each state "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries," and affirms "freedom of navigation through international waterways." The resolution also asks that the Secretary General send a "special representative" to the Middle East to help achieve a negotiated peace.

Nov. 23—Nasser, speaking in Cairo, asserts that he will continue to refuse passage to Israeli ships through the Suez Canal; he also declares that withdrawal of Israeli forces from captured U.A.R., Jordanian, and Syrian territory is not a question for negotiation.

United Nations

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis and Cyprus Dispute*)

Nov. 7—By a vote of 111-0, the General Assembly adopts a declaration upholding equal rights for women and defining discrimination against women.

Nov. 8—The Security Council hears charges by Congolese (Kinshasa) Deputy Foreign Minister Jean Umba di Lutete that last week white mercenaries invaded the Congo from Angola, acting in collusion with Portuguese authorities.

Nov. 15—In a resolution adopted by consensus, the Security Council condemns Portugal for allowing her territory of Angola to be used as a base for mercenaries operating against the Congo.

Nov. 17—By a vote of 82-7 (with 21 abstentions), the General Assembly adopts a Trusteeship Committee resolution con-

demning Portugal's policies toward Africa.

Nov. 23—U.N. Secretary General U Thant announces that Gunnar Jarring, Swedish ambassador in Moscow, will serve as the U.N. special representative to the Middle East.

Nov. 24—At the request of the chief delegate from Cyprus, Zenon Rossides, the Security Council meets to discuss the Cyprus conflict. U Thant issues an appeal to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to guard against any act that might set off a war. He urges the removal of all non-Cypriote forces from Cyprus except for the U.N. peacekeeping mission.

Nov. 25—The Security Council by consensus expresses support of U Thant's appeal to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey to remain calm.

Nov. 29—The General Assembly, voting 58 to 45 with 17 abstentions, defeats a draft resolution to admit Communist China to the U.N.

War in Vietnam

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 2—U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey ends his visit to South Vietnam. Before boarding his plane at Chulai Airport, Humphrey says the military situation in Vietnam shows that "tremendous progress has been made." Later, in Malaysia, Humphrey declares, "I think that we are winning this struggle."

Nov. 11—In the Central Highlands near Dakto, U.S. paratroopers and foot soldiers engage in 2 intense battles. Since fighting erupted in the area on November 3, 521 North Vietnamese and 76 Americans have been killed.

Nov. 14—In an article in *Nhan Dan*, Hanoi newspaper and publication of the Workers (Communist) party, North Vietnam rejects President Johnson's offer of November 11 to hold peace negotiations aboard "a neutral ship in a neutral sea."

Nov. 15—Arriving in the U.S. for a high-level discussion with President Johnson, General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. military commander in Vietnam, declares

that the war effort in Vietnam is "very, very encouraging."

Nov. 16—North Vietnamese forces attack the U.S. army center at Dakto.

U.S. navy planes bomb the Haiphong shipyard, in the western outskirts of the city. This is the first attack on this area.

Nov. 18—In a broadcast over the clandestine Liberation radio, it is announced that the National Liberation Front (political arm of the Vietcong) has agreed to observe cease-fires at Christmas, the New Year and *Tet* (the Vietnamese lunar New Year).

Nov. 21—Westmoreland, addressing the National Press Club, declares that Vietcong rebels are becoming more and more dependent on North Vietnam to fill their dwindling ranks.

Nov. 23—In Washington, officials report that there are indications that ammunition supplies headed for enemy forces in South Vietnam may be sent via the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville without the knowledge of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, chief of state of Cambodia. A study is to be made of the possibility of quarantining the Cambodian coastline.

Nov. 26—U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker returns to Saigon after an 18-day visit to the U.S.

World Bank, The

(See *U.S., Government*)

AFGHANISTAN

Nov. 1—Nour Ahmad Etemadi is appointed Premier by King Mohammad Zahir.

ALGERIA

Nov. 24—Algeria and the Congo renew diplomatic relations, broken in 1964 by Algeria.

ARGENTINA

Nov. 14—It is announced in Buenos Aires that the Soviet Union has offered Argentina \$60 million in aid for a hydroelectric project.

BOLIVIA

Nov. 17—Régis Debray, French Marxist, is convicted of participation in Ernesto "Che" Guevara's guerrilla movement and is sentenced to 30 years in a Bolivian military

prison. Ciro Bustos, an Argentine artist, is similarly convicted and sentenced.

Nov. 26—Eleven priests, who have parishes in the mining districts, publish a statement charging the government with repression of workers in the state-owned mines. The statement is authorized by the Bolivian hierarchy and appears in *Presencia*, a leading newspaper supported by the National Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops.

Nov. 29—Military authorities say 5 survivors of Guevara's band of guerrillas have apparently slipped through an army trap into the lowland jungles along the Beni River.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl., War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 4—At a news conference, Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk scores U.S. policy in Vietnam, but declares relations with the U.S. (ended in 1965) can be resumed if the U.S. will recognize Cambodia's territorial integrity and existing frontiers, and avoid violations of her borders.

Nov. 9—Criticizing incursions by U.S. troops, Sihanouk states that he will no longer aid in attempts to release Americans held by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

CANADA

Nov. 19—Responding to the devaluation of the British pound, the Bank of Canada raises its basic lending rate to 6 per cent from 5 per cent.

Nov. 23—Voting 114 to 87, the House of Commons approves, for a 5-year trial period, the abolition of capital punishment for all murders except those of police and prison guards.

Nov. 28—Government and opposition members of Parliament voice overwhelming approval of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's condemnation of de Gaulle's call for a separate Quebec.

Nov. 30—Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp announces a 5 per cent surcharge on personal income taxes effective January 1, 1968.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Nov. 16—The French newspaper *Le Monde* reports that approximately 10 days ago French paratroopers arrived in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic. President Jean Bedel Bokassa requested the paratroopers in a show of support for his government, because of hostility to the austerity program.

CHILE

Nov. 13—President Belaúnde Terry suffers a major setback when the Christian Democratic party, the minority partner in his coalition government, withdraws. The action follows the defeat of Belaúnde's Popular Action party in 2 special elections yesterday to fill vacant seats in the lower house of Congress.

Nov. 24—The government orders the arrest of all labor leaders who took part in yesterday's general strike that left 5 persons dead and 66 injured.

CHINA, NATIONALIST

Nov. 24—The government confirms rumors that on November 19 Chinese Nationalist guerrillas destroyed 8 MIG-19 jets in a raid against an air base in Kwantung Province on the mainland.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

(See *U.K. Territories, Hong Kong*)

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 3—The government calls for a U.N. Security Council meeting to discuss Congolese charges of an invasion by a different group of foreign mercenaries from Angola.

Nov. 5—The International Committee of the Red Cross confirms that the Katangese gendarmes and white mercenaries from Bukavu led by Colonel Jean Schramme have crossed into Rwanda and put down their arms. (See *Congo, Current History*, December, 1967, p. 373.)

CUBA

Nov. 6—The Cuban ambassador fails to attend Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny's

reception at the Kremlin for the heads of all diplomatic missions on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chinese chargé d'affaires is the only other absentee.

CYPRUS

(See *Intl, Cyprus Dispute*)

FRANCE

(See also *Central African Republic*)

Nov. 27—At his semiannual news conference, President de Gaulle calls for a sovereign Quebec, says France "at present" will not negotiate a British entry into the E.E.C., decries U.S. financial domination of Europe and condemns Israel as the aggressor in the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Nov. 11—At the 3d annual convention of the extreme right-wing National Democratic party, Chairman Adolf von Thadden pledges that the party will be "the seeding ground for the rebirth of the German nation."

Nov. 22—Approximately 1,000 leftists establish a new party, the Union of the Democratic Left.

GREECE

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Dispute*)

Nov. 3—The government publishes an act abolishing jury trials for all common and political crimes and for some press offenses. The regime also reduces the jurisdiction of the special courts-martial, established after the April, 1967, coup.

INDIA

Nov. 21—The government ousts the unstable opposition United Front governments of Haryana and West Bengal. In West Bengal, P. C. Ghosh is sworn in as chief minister and subsequently forbids unauthorized meetings of more than 5 people in Calcutta and nearby industrial areas. In Haryana, President Zakir Husain dissolves the assembly and places the state under control of the national government.

Nov. 22—A general strike called by the West

Bengal United Front paralyzes Calcutta.

The United Front government in Punjab collapses, as Chief Minister Gurnam Singh resigns following the defection from the party of 17 supporters, including 6 cabinet ministers.

The Congress party in Punjab decides to support the defectors in forming another government.

Nov. 24—Voting 215 to 88, Parliament defeats a motion to censure Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government because it removed the 2 opposition governments in Haryana and West Bengal.

Nov. 26—Rioting subsides in Calcutta. Police report 2,810 arrests.

Nov. 29—The speaker of the West Bengal assembly blocks the new government from taking power. In a procedural ruling, he claims that dismissal of the United Front was unconstitutional and invalid.

INDONESIA

Nov. 6—U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey ends his 3-day visit; it is announced that acting President Suharto has been invited to visit the U.S. in 1968.

Nov. 16—*Antara* (the official news agency) announces that 351 members of the Communist underground have been arrested in the last 2 weeks.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; France*)

Nov. 27—The Ahdut Haavoda party approves a merger with the governing Mapai party.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 5—More than 60,000 people protest Premier Eisaku Sato's forthcoming trip to the U.S.

Nov. 13—Sato leaves for Washington.

Nov. 18—Major newspapers and prominent government officials praise Sato's success in reclaiming the Bonin Islands from the U.S., but express disappointment over the inconclusive action on Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands.

Nov. 20—Sato returns to Tokyo.

The Tokyo stock exchange index declines sharply in its largest loss for any one day since World War II. British devaluation is said to be the cause.

Nov. 22—Sato gives final approval for the construction of Japan's 1st nuclear-powered vessel, an 8,300-gross-ton special purpose freighter.

Nov. 25—In a move to strengthen his position, Sato reshuffles his cabinet; 7 ministers are retained.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Nov. 26—King Hussein returns from a 6-week tour of Arab and Western nations.

LAOS

Nov. 2—Chief of State Prince Souvanna Phouma, who arrived in Australia yesterday for a 12-day state visit, says his government opposes a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam until all North Vietnamese troops leave the South.

MALAYSIA

Nov. 2—U.S. Vice President Humphrey, who arrived yesterday, confers with Prime Minister Prince Abdul Rahman.

Nov. 23—Malaysia and the Soviet Union establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

NIGERIA

Nov. 22—An Organization of African Unity mission, headed by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, arrives in Lagos.

Nov. 23—Selassie states that the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria are not negotiable.

Nov. 24—The 4 African heads of state, comprising the O.A.U. mission, end their talks with the federal government. A communiqué discloses that the Ghanaian chief of state, Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, will contact Biafran leaders and seek a settlement.

PANAMA

Nov. 23—Ex-President Arnulfo Arias announces he will head a joint slate backed

by 4 former rival parties in the presidential elections in May, 1968.

PERU

Nov. 17—Raul Ferrero Regalaiti is sworn in as the new premier. He replaces Edgard Seoane, who resigned following the defeat of the government in 2 by-elections.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Nov. 16—Preliminary results of the November 14 Senate elections indicate victory for the National party led by President Ferdinand Marcos.

PORTUGAL

(See *Intl, U.N.; Congo, U.S., Foreign Policy*)

RHODESIA

Nov. 11—The 2d anniversary of Rhodesian independence is celebrated.

SOUTH YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF

(See *British Territories, South Arabia*)

SPAIN

Nov. 25—Attempting to combat inflation, the government announces a 1-year austerity program.

Nov. 28—Generalissimo Francisco Franco inaugurates the newly-elected 102-member National Council of the Movement, the country's only legal political organization.

TURKEY

(See *Intl, Cyprus Dispute*)

U.S.S.R., THE

Nov. 3—General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev opens the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution with a 4-hour speech.

Nov. 7—In a parade reviewing military progress in the Soviet Union, 5 new types of missiles are displayed.

Nov. 14—*Izvestia* (the official government newspaper) publishes a government decree designed to stimulate economic reform. Beginning January 1, 1968, factories will be fined up to 20 per cent of the value of goods for the delivery of defective merchandise or incomplete sets of equipment.

Nov. 18—General Nikolai Yegorov and Mar-

shal Nikolai Krylov confirm U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's November 3 statement on Soviet missile development, saying "the Soviet Union has developed missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets along ballistic and orbital trajectories. The warheads . . . carry devices to break through the enemy's anti-missile defenses." (See also *U.S., Military*.)

It is reported by *The Christian Science Monitor* that the Soviet Union has offered to aid stabilization of Yemen and South Arabia in return for its diplomatic recognition by Saudi Arabia.

Nov. 20—According to an article in *Pravda* (party newspaper), the early 1967 experimental transfer of 400 deficit-operated state farms to a self-supporting profit system resulted in improved efficiency, increased profits and reduced costs.

Nov. 24—*Tass*, the Soviet press agency, reports that 18 Communist parties will gather in Budapest for a world Communist meeting in February, 1968.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C. and Monetary Crisis*)

Nov. 2—In 3 by-elections, the Labour party loses 2 parliamentary seats.

Nov. 13—It is reported from London, that the British government has received, from Western countries, \$250 million in international credits for support of the pound. The credit will evidently be used to pay the \$255 million due in December on a loan from the International Monetary Fund.

Nov. 18—The government devalues the pound by 14.3 per cent, reducing its official value from \$2.80 to \$2.40. The government orders all banks and stock exchanges to remain closed on November 20; other measures taken to slow the economy are: imposition of higher interest rates (from 6.5 to 8 per cent) and higher taxes and reductions in government spending. Wages are not frozen.

Nov. 21—In trading on the London stock exchange, the pound is strong and closes at its support ceiling of \$2.42. The London gold price holds at its dollar ceiling of \$35.19 $\frac{7}{8}$.

Nov. 29—Roy Jenkins is named Chancellor of the Exchequer, replacing James Callaghan, who assumes Jenkins' previous post as Home Secretary.

The International Monetary Fund grants Britain a \$1.4-billion credit; in return Britain must cut her forthcoming budget deficit by \$2.16 billion.

British Territories

Hong Kong (Crown Colony)

Nov. 20—It is reported from Hong Kong that British police officer Frank G. Knight has escaped from Communist China. He was kidnapped on October 14.

Nov. 30—*Hsinhua*, the official Peking press agency, discloses that Britain has agreed to 6 conditions to end the 7-months of violence at the China-Hong Kong border.

South Arabia, Federation of

Nov. 5—More than 2,000 demonstrators calling for a cease-fire bring to a halt the 3 days of heavy fighting between the 2 nationalist groups, the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) and the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen.

Nov. 7—The South Arabian federal army announces its support of the N.L.F.

Nov. 8—It is reported by *The Times* (London) that the N.L.F. has won its battle with the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen.

Nov. 28—Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, British High Commissioner, declares South Arabia independent.

Nov. 29—In Geneva, N.L.F. leader Qahtan al-Shaabi and British Minister Without Portfolio Lord Shackleton sign "a memorandum of points of agreement" transferring sovereignty from the colonial power to the former colony. A joint communiqué states that Britain will continue financial assistance for civil and military purposes for the next 6 months.

Nov. 30—Qahtan al-Shaabi becomes President and proclaims the independence of the People's Republic of South Yemen. He is empowered to rule by decree for 2 years, with a 13-man high command of the N.L.F. serving as legislature.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

(See also *Politics*)

Nov. 8—Robert G. Clark, a Negro educator, is elected to a seat in the Mississippi Legislature; he is the first Negro to sit in that legislature in more than 50 years.

Nov. 14—The Treasury orders all banks, savings and loan associations and other agents selling U.S. Government Savings Bonds to abide by its equal employment opportunities rules and avoid racial discrimination in hiring, promotion and training. 6,000 savings and loan associations and savings banks are affected. The Treasury has already ordered 12,000 commercial banks with government deposits to avoid discrimination.

Economy

(See also *United Kingdom*)

Nov. 7—The Department of Labor reports that in October unemployment reached 4.3 per cent—its highest level in 2 years.

Nov. 18—President Lyndon Johnson promises that the U.S. will continue "to buy and sell gold at the existing price of \$35 an ounce."

Nov. 19—Because of the British devaluation of the pound, the United States raises its official lending rate—the rate at which the Federal Reserve system lends to member banks—from 4 to 4.5 per cent, to protect the dollar. (See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*.)

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Dispute, Middle East Crisis, Monetary Crisis and War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 2—The U.S. tells Portuguese Ambassador Vasco Vieira Garin that the U.S. views the incursion of 100 white mercenaries from Portuguese Angola into the Congo with "grave disquiet."

Nov. 10—U.S. officials report that, in a still unsigned agreement, the U.S. has agreed to send missiles to Thailand and Thailand has agreed in principle to send 10,000 troops to Vietnam.

Nov. 11—The President asks for peace in Vietnam and offers to meet North Vietnamese officials to negotiate "on a neutral ship on a neutral sea."

Nov. 12—With President Johnson in the congregation of his church, the Reverend Cotesworth Pinckney Lewis interrupts a sermon to ask for "some logical, straightforward explanation" of the U.S. presence in Vietnam. Last night the President concluded a 2-day, 5,100-mile, 7-speech tour to plead for support for the war.

Nov. 13—Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam General William C. Westmoreland leaves Saigon for Washington to join Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker in conferences with the President.

In Washington, Bunker predicts increased stability for the South Vietnamese government in 1968.

Nov. 14—In Washington, Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato endorses U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Nov. 15—The President and Sato issue a joint communiqué stating plans for conferences on restoring Japanese rule to the Bonin Islands; the status of the formerly Japanese Ryukyu Islands are to be kept "under joint and continuous review."

Nov. 17—At a White House news conference, President Johnson scores dissent of the "storm trooper bullying" sort; he says he considers all advice, but will continue to use his own judgment on Vietnam.

Nov. 20—Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) calls for direct negotiations between the government of South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

U.S. officials confirm that Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman is leaving for Pakistan tomorrow and then going on to confer with Yugoslav President Tito and Rumanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu.

Nov. 22—The President names former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance as his special envoy to Cyprus.

Nov. 25—In a 1-year agreement effective January 1, 1968, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree to cut down the level of Soviet fishing in waters along the Middle Atlantic Coast. This is the first U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral accord since the airlines agreement November 4, 1966, permitting direct air service between New York and Moscow.

Nov. 30—Voting 82 to 1, the Senate approves a resolution asking the President to consider "appropriate action" to bring the problem of Vietnam before the U.N. Security Council.

Government

Nov. 1—The President asks Congress not to adjourn until it "faces up" to national needs, particularly the need for a tax rise.

Nov. 3—Signing a \$10-billion appropriation bill including money for the model cities program and rent supplements for low income families, the President criticizes "the familiar old voices of reaction" in Congress.

Nov. 4—The President signs a law making it a crime to block a federal criminal investigation by force, the threat of force, bribery or intimidation.

Nov. 8—President Johnson signs a bill calling for equal opportunity for women in the U.S. armed forces.

Nov. 14—The President signs a law allowing the Alaska communications system to be sold to private industry.

The Central Intelligence Agency announces the transfer of campus recruiting conferences to nearby off-campus locations in some 6 colleges and universities, to avoid the "embarrassment" of anti-C.I.A. demonstrations.

Nov. 15—The President signs the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, a \$2.86-billion authorization bill; the appropriation bill is still pending.

Nov. 16—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopts a resolution asking the President not to commit U.S. troops overseas without "affirmative action" by Congress.

Nov. 20—In the lobby of the Department of Commerce, the “census clock” reports the nation’s population has reached 200 million.

Nov. 21—The President signs the Air Quality Act of 1967; the bill authorizes a 3-year, \$428-million program to counter air pollution.

The House takes final action to approve a bill extending the Peace Corps through June, 1968.

Nov. 27—It is reported by *The New York Times* that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara will be appointed president of the World Bank early in 1968.

Nov. 28—It is reported in Washington that the President has ordered most government agencies to economize by cutting personnel costs some 2 per cent and reducing expenses on “controllable” programs by 10 per cent. It is hoped that Administration reduction of some \$4 billion in expenditures will induce Congress to consider the President’s requested 10 per cent tax surcharge.

In a television interview, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower suggests that the U.S. consider U.S. ground attacks in North Vietnam, and “hot pursuit” of enemy troops into Laos and Cambodia, and of enemy planes into China, if necessary.

Nov. 29—McNamara formally accepts the offer to become president of the World Bank; he is to assume the new post early in 1968.

The White House announces the resignation of John M. Doar as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice; his assistant, Stephen J. Pollack, is named to succeed him.

Labor

Nov. 8—The Chrysler Corporation reaches a tentative agreement with the United Automobile Workers to avoid a midnight strike threat.

Nov. 10—At 10 Chrysler plants, 37,000 workers remain idle, disregarding the agreement signed by U.A.W. President Walter Reuther.

The Ford Motor Company reaches an

agreement at its Dallas plant; this was the only Ford facility still strike-bound.

Nov. 14—Local strikes plague the General Motors Corporation; production is reported as nearly normal at Chrysler.

Military

Nov. 3—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tells a news conference that the U.S.S.R. is perfecting an orbital nuclear bomb system. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 6—The Department of Defense announces that McNamara has authorized a 12,000-man increase in the National Guard; these men will be available for riot control duty.

Officials of the Defense Department tell the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee that the “light” antimissile defense system now being developed will be adequate against a Chinese missile attack, and will offer limited defense against an orbital bomb.

Nov. 7—Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, director of Selective Service, says in a telephone interview that in a letter from him October 26, draft boards were urged to “live up to the letter” of the draft laws and induct or support the prosecution of draft law violators, including those who stage antiwar protests, if such demonstrations obstruct the operations of the Selective Service System.

Nov. 21—McNamara orders early discharges from the armed forces for those wanting to enter civilian police work. It is reported that there are 15,000 nationwide police jobs unfilled.

The Defense Department requests a January, 1968, draft of 34,000, nearly double the December, 1967, call.

Politics

Nov. 7—The election of Republican Louie B. Nunn as governor of Kentucky gives the Republicans control of 26 governorships. Kentucky has not elected a Republican governor since 1943.

Massachusetts Secretary of State Kevin

White defeats Louise Day Hicks as mayor of Boston. Mrs. Hicks' support for neighborhood schools was widely regarded as anti-Negro.

Negro Democrat Richard Hatcher is elected mayor of Gary, Indiana.

Carl B. Stokes, a Negro Democrat, is elected mayor of Cleveland.

Nov. 18—Michigan's Governor George Romney declares he will fight for the Republican nomination to run as the 1968 presidential candidate.

Nov. 30—Senator Eugene McCarthy says he will contest the nomination of Lyndon Johnson for the Democratic presidential candidacy in 5 or 6 1968 Democratic primaries.

Science and Space

Nov. 9—The Saturn 5 rocket is launched and places an Apollo spacecraft in orbit. Saturn 5 is a 3-stage moon rocket, generating 160 million horsepower of thrust. The most powerful space vehicle ever tested, it lifts a payload of 285 thousand pounds into orbit.

Surveyor 6 lands on the moon and relays televised pictures to earth.

Supreme Court

Nov. 6—The Maryland loyalty oath required of all state employees is ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Justices Potter Stewart and William O. Douglas dissent from a decision of the Court refusing to hear the appeal of 3 soldiers who refuse to go to Vietnam because they allege the war there is illegal.

Nov. 13—The Court rules unanimously that if a person on probation is involved in hearings to revoke probation or reimpose a suspended sentence, he has a right to counsel.

URUGUAY

Nov. 20—Wide-ranging price increases go into effect as the result of the devaluation of the Uruguayan *peso*, November 6.

VENEZUELA

Nov. 14—The Venezuelan government rein-

states constitutional rights, suspended in March following a wave of Castroite terrorism.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 27—It is reported in Washington that diplomatic sources say President Ho Chi Minh is ill.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 9—A spokesman for President Nguyen Van Thieu names 19 cabinet ministers, including 2 new appointees.

Nov. 15—In a speech at Independence Palace, South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Van Loc outlines a "program of action" encompassing military reorganization, land reform, a campaign against illiteracy, refugee relief, social welfare programs, and an end to corruption.

YEMEN

Nov. 5—A bloodless coup deposes President Abdullah al-Salal. Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, dissident republican leader, becomes provisional chief of state.

Nov. 6—The republican regime pledges to uphold a republican form of government; a new cabinet with a 3-man Presidential Council is sworn in.

Nov. 16—Premier Mohsen al-Aini announces that U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser has agreed to continue aid to Yemen.

Nov. 20—Ahmed Mohammed Noman resigns his membership in the 3-man Council because it has refused to cooperate with the Arab 3-nation committee on Yemen.

ERRATUM: We regret that on page 202 of our October, 1967, issue, an editorial error appeared in John C. Campbell's biographical sketch. His *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead* was published by the University of Minnesota Press, at Minneapolis.

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